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YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
The Problem of Wage Theft
Nicole Hallett
Wage theft inflicts seriousharm on America's working poor but has
received little attention from policymakers seeking to address income
inequality in the United States. This Article provides a comprehensive
analysisof the causes ofthe wage theft crisisand the failureof the current
enforcement regime to address it It argues that existing policy reforms
will fail, because they misunderstand the nature of the crisis and the
incentives that employers face when deciding to steal workers' wages. It
then proposes series of reforms that could work, while arguing that
changingthe economiccalculusalone willbe unlikely to solve theproblem
ifsocialnormsremain unchanged.
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INTRODUCTION

The minimum wage has been an important part of the social safety net
since Congress first enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") in
1938.1 President Roosevelt called it "the most far-reaching, far-sighted
program for the benefit of workers ever adopted here or in any other
country." 2 FLSA contains one of the broadest definitions of "employee" in
federal law today3 and, unlike other employment statutes, FLSA covers all
but the smallest employers.4 The cornerstone of FLSA is the provision
guaranteeing a minimum wage for all hours worked, a once-radical idea
that has gained widespread public acceptance.5

1.

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2018)).

2.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Radio Address of the President, (May 24, 1938), in
TEACHING AM. HIST. http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/
radio-address-of-the-president [http://perma.cc/3U2H-98GJ].

3.

See United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945) ("A broader or
more comprehensive coverage of employees within the stated categories
would be difficult to frame.").

4.

Employers are covered under the FLSA if they have an annual dollar volume
of sales or business done of at least $500,000 (enterprise coverage). 29
U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A)(ii) (2018). Even if there is no enterprise coverage,
individual employees can be covered if they "engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2018).

5.

See Niv Elis, Poll:BipartisanMajoritySupports Raising the Minimum Wage,
HILL (June 1, 2017), http://thehill.com/homenews/335837-poll-bipartisan[http://perma.cc/3G8T-9ESQ];
majority-supports-raising-minimum-wage
Press Release, New Poll Shows Overwhelming Support for Major Minimum
Wage Increase, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT (Jan. 15, 2015) http://www.nelp.org/
content/uploads/2015/03/PR-Federal-Minimum-Wage-Poll-Jan-2015.pdf
[http://perma.cc/QKG3-QTEK] (polls demonstrating that 75% of Americans
support an increase in the federal minimum wage to $12.50 by 2020).
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Despite this popularity, the federal minimum wage has not been raised
since 2009,6 and adjusted for inflation, is at its lowest point since 1955.7
State and cities have stepped in to fill the gap. Twenty-nine states and the
District of Columbia8 as well as dozens of cities and counties9 have enacted
minimum wage rates above the federal rate. Eighteen states and twenty
cities saw their minimum wages rise at the beginning of 2018.10 The Fight
for Fifteen,' an organizing movement that advocates for a $15.00
minimum wage across the country, has seen its position go from radical to
mainstream,1 2 which would have been unimaginable just a few years ago.13
Several cities, including New York City, Seattle, Syracuse, and Pittsburgh,
have enacted a $15.00 minimum wage, almost twice that of the federal
rate. In April 2016, California became the first state to enact a statewide
minimum wage of $15.00 per hour. 4 Campaigns in other states are
already underway.
6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

11.
12.

13.

14.

See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (2018).
See Annalyn Kurtz & Tal Yellin, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/
interactive/economy/minimum-wage-since-1938/index.html
[http://perma.cc/24FB-FWAW].
See Wage and H our Division, Minimum Wage Laws in the States - January1,
2017 U.S. DEP'T LABOR http://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/america.htm
[http://perma.cc/45TH-6C6V].
See CityMinimum Wage Laws: Recent Trends andEconomic Evidence, NAT'L
EMP'T LAW PROJECT 2-4 (2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/CityMinimum-Wage-Laws-Recent-Trends-Economic-Evidence.pdf
[http://perma.cc/E6R6-PJA7].
See Grace Donnelly, The Minimum Wage Will Increase on January1 for 18
States and20 Cities, FORTUNE (Dec. 20, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/
20/minimum-wage-increases-jan-2018 [http://perma.cc/D8SS-7Z49].
See FIGHT FOR FIFTEEN, http://fightforl5.org [http://perma.cc/8LDB-FC6R].
See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, How the Minimum Wage Movement Entered
the Mainstream, NEW YORKER (Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/
news/benjamin-wallace-wells/how-the-minimum-wage-movemententered-the-mainstream [http://perma.cc/35S3-3DEH].
See Chris Kirkham & Samantha Masunaga, Why the Success of the $15
Minimum Wage Movement Has SurprisedIts Leaders, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 11,
2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fl-1111-minimum-wage-prote
sts-20151111-story.html [http://perma.cc/RRQ5-XTYS].
See John Bacon, $15 Minimum Wage Coming to New York, Calif, USA TODAY
(Apr. 4, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/ 04/
04/california-new-york-minimum-wage-hikes-signed-into-law/82617510
[http://perma.cc/D8N2-UD8D]. The minimum wage will not reach $15 per
hour until 2022. Seeid.
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The push to increase the minimum wage is part of a broader
movement to address income inequality in the United States. The financial
crisis and its aftermath sparked a renewed focus on the most economically
vulnerable in American society. The minimum wage is an obvious target
for those interested in addressing poverty and economic inequality. An
individual with one or more children who works full-time making the
federal minimum wage will fall below the federal poverty line's and will
still need to access federal safety net programs. Though calls for a "living
wage" have been around for decades, 16 the concept has gained new
currency in the post-Great Recession debate, and as Democrats have
moved leftward in the Trump era.17
Absent from the debate, however, is an acknowledgement of the fact
that almost two million workers in the United States are paid less than the
minimum wage, notwithstanding current minimum wage laws.' 8 Some of
these workers are not covered under minimum wage laws; the rise of the
contingent workforce and the gig economy has meant that the number of
workers classified as "independent contractors" continues to increase
every year. 9 But many should be covered and are victims of wage theft by

15.

What are the Annual Earnings for a Full-Time Minimum Wage Worker,
POVERTY RESEARCH, http://poverty.ucdavis.edu/faq/what-are-

CENTER FOR

annual-earnings-full-time-minimum-wage-worker

[http://perma.cc/Z29C-

EX63].
16.

Paul K. Sonn & Stephanie Luce, New Directions for the Living Wage
Movement in THE GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY: WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM

269 (Annette Bernhardt et al. eds., 2008).
See Bryce Covert, DemocratsAre Now All on Board With a $15 Minimum
Wage, THINK PROGRESS (Apr. 26, 2017), http://thinkprogress.org/democratsOF AMERICA'S LABOR MARKET

17.

15-minimum-wage-bill-f7631a21ec24 [http://perma.cc/2WF9-69RX].

18.

See Characteristicsof Minimum Wage Workers, 2013, at 1, BUREAU LABOR
STAT., (2014) https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/minimum-wage/archive/

[https://perma.cc/865E-5C2G]
minimumwageworkers_2013.pdf
(calculating that 1.8 million workers in the U.S. make below the minimum
wage); Eastern Research Group, The Social and Economic Effects of Wage
ViolationsEstimatesfor CaliforniaandNew York FinalRepor U.S. DEP'T OF
https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/completed-studies/
LABOR (2014),
[http://perma.cc/2EHM-L7QF]
WageViolationsReportDecember2014.pdf
(finding that minimum wage violations amount to between $1.6 billion and
$2.6 billion in lost wages in New York and California alone).
19.

An independent contractor is defined as "a person who contracts with

another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the other nor
subject to the other's right to control with respect to his physical conduct in
the performance of the undertaking." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 2.3
(AM. LAW INST. 1958). In general, workers classified as independent
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their employers. The prevalence of wage theft rivals and even surpasses
other categories of theft that receive considerably more public attention
and law enforcement resources. Employers steal more wages from
workers each year than is stolen in "bank robberies, convenience store
robberies, street and highway robberies, and gas station robberies
combined."2 0 Wage theft is, by many accounts, one of the most common
crimes committed in the United States.
Because the working poor are disproportionately affected by the
pervasive violation and under-enforcement of wage and hour laws, any
effort to address income inequality and economic stratification must tackle
this problem. Yet policymakers have focused more on increasing the
minimum wage than they have on enforcing the existing minimum wage
laws.
Some state and local governments-spurred by coalitions of worker
centers and labor advocates-have begun to address the problem by
enacting "wage theft laws" that aim to increase employer compliance with
the law. Unfortunately, these laws have had minimal effect because they
misunderstand the nature of the problem: the probability of being caught
for wage theft is so low that it makes economic sense for employers to
commit wage theft on a massive scale. The solutions proposed to address
the problem either underestimate this cost-benefit imbalance or fail to
acknowledge it altogether. In order to solve the problem of wage theft, one
must first understand why and how wage theft occurs and then develop
solutions informed by this analysis.
This Article aims to make several course corrections in the policy
debate about low-wage workers and the minimum wage. First, it argues
that a push for minimum wage increases must be coupled with a focus on
preventing wage theft. Second, it argues that policymakers must take
seriously the economics of wage theft when crafting policy interventions.

20.

contractors are not protected by labor and employment laws, including the
FLSA. Because of this, many companies illegally attempt to reclassify
employees as independent contractors to cut labor costs and avoid liability.
Studies suggest that up to thirty percent of independent contractors are
misclassified by employers. See LALITH DE SILVA ET AL., STUDY OF ALTERNATIVE
WORK ARRANGEMENTS: INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (2000), _http://wdr.doleta.
gov/owsdrr/00-5/00-5.pdf [http://perma.cc/J9AH-S5CK]. Nevertheless,
some workers are properly classified as independent contractors under
current law, and employers are not required to pay these contractors the
minimum wage.
Ross Eisenbrey, Wage Theft Is a BiggerProblem than Other Theft - But Not
Enough Is Done to Protect Workers, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Apr. 2, 2014),
http://www.epi.org/publication/wage-theft-bigger-problem-theft-protect
[https://perma.cc/E6FY-F992].
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Specifically, it points to the importance of enforcement and argues that
with abysmally low enforcement rates, no amount of tweaking the
penalties of wage theft violators will make a dent in the wage theft crisis.
Finally, it acknowledges that in order to ensure wage justice for low-wage
workers, it may be necessary to think beyond traditional deterrence-to
changing social norms to support compliance with wage and hour laws.
I.

THE WAGE THEFT CRISIS

Wage theft is a relatively new term that refers to a constellation of
behaviors by employers that result in workers not receiving wages to
which they are legally entitled. Popularized in the last decade by labor
activists and progressive scholars, the term recognizes that when workers
are not paid the minimum wage or overtime, their employers are in effect
committing a form of theft.2 1 It is intentionally provocative in its
characterization of common employer behavior as a crime. Forms of theft
that disproportionately affect the poor and working class have been
historically considered much less serious than property crimes that are
more likely to affect the upper socio-economic strata of society. Advocates
using the term "wage theft" seek to correct this disparity by using a term
that expresses the seriousness of the act and the moral culpability of those
who commit it.
Wage theft takes many forms. As Kim Bobo explains in her book, Wage
Theft in America, employers may pay less than the minimum wage or not
pay an overtime premium for hours worked above forty per week. 22 They
may pay workers with checks that bounce or fail to pay them at all,
claiming financial insolvency of some kind.23 They may purposefully
misclassify their workers as independent contractors or as "exempt"
employees in an effort to avoid paying legal wages.2 4 They may require
their employees to work "off-the-clock" to cut down on the amount paid,2 5
or require workers to pay recruiting fees, or illegally deduct wages from
workers' paychecks for things such as work-related equipment or for a

21.

Though it existed before, the term "wage theft" was popularized by Kim
Bobo's book, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE

NOT GETTING PAID - AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (2009), and is now in
widespread use.
22.

Id. at 25.

23.

Id at 27.

24.

Id. at 35-37.

25.

Id.at26-27.
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short register.26 In industries where workers receive tips, employers may
steal some of these tips, either by pocketing cash or by deducting a
percentage from tips paid by credit card.27 Commonly, employers refuse to
pay the final paycheck after a worker quits or is fired.28 Sometimes,
employers engage in multiple strategies to deny workers their lawfully
earned wages. This Article focuses mostly on minimum wage violations
because they are the type of violation most likely to affect workers at the
bottom of the wage distribution.
The term wage theft has generated quite a bit of controversy from
those who believe it unfairly vilifies business owners. These critics argue
that wage and hours laws are a complicated morass that are difficult for
even the savviest employer to understand, and that technical violations of
the law can lead to harsh penalties, layoffs, and in extreme cases,
bankruptcy. 29 Of course, not every violation of federal and state wage and
hour laws is intentional. An employer may misinterpret the law in good
faith or make a clerical mistake that causes a loss to workers. The
categorization of all violations of federal and state wage and hours laws as
"wage theft" may require the term to bear too much.
However, the ubiquity of wage theft suggests that it often stems from a
conscious decision by employers to skirt the law and cheat their workers.
Most low-wage workers will become victims of wage theft at some point in
their careers, with women, minorities, and those without legal
authorization to work in the United States particularly vulnerable.3 0 A

26.
27.

Id. at 29.
Id.at 32-33.

28.

Id. at 34-35.

29.

See, e.g., Kim Jansen, State Sen. Jim Oberweis Explains How the Term 'Wage
Theft' Is Like, Um, Wife-Beating CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 17, 2017),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chicagoinc/ct-jim-oberweis-wife-be
[http://perma.cc/CZ4X-MU
ating-0319-chicago-inc-20170317-story.html
HU] (state senator arguing that accusing an employer of committing wage
theft is like asking whether he beats his wife); Jon Hyman, Revisiting the
Misnamed and Misunderstood Term "Wage Theft" OHIO EMP'R LAW BLOG
(Apr. 24, 2014) http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2014/04/ revisiting
[http://perma.cc/7NK2-CAWN]
-misnamed-and-misunderstood.html
("'Theft' connotes bad intent-yet most wage and hour mistakes are honest
ones born out of a misunderstanding of the law, not a desire to cheat or steal
from employees."); Daniel A. Schwartz, "Wage Theft": The Trendy Phrase
that May Not Mean what You Think It Means, CONN. EMP'T LAw BLOG
http://www.ctemploymentlawblog.com/2014/04/articles/wage-theft-thetrendy-phrase-that-runs-amok [http://perma.cc/MVP5-XF5J].

30.

Id.at42.
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2009 study by the National Employment Law Project found that 26% of
workers in certain low-wage industries in Chicago, Los Angeles, and New
York reported making less than minimum wage.3 ' More than 60% of these
workers were underpaid by more than $1.00 per hour.32 Seventy-six
percent of workers who worked over 40 hours per week were not paid for
all of their overtime, with employers failing to pay them for an average of
11 hours of overtime per week.3 3 Nearly 17% had worked off-the-clock for
no pay 3 4 and 12% of tipped employees reported that their employer or
manager had stolen some or all of their tips.3 5 Overtime violation rates
were even higher, approaching 80-90% in some industries.3 Wage theft
varies dramatically by industry, with the highest rates seen in childcare,
beauty and personal services, retail, food service, car wash, and home
health care. 7 In all, 68% of workers surveyed experienced at least one
pay-related violation in the previous week.3 8 The fact that the vast
majority of low-wage workers regularly experience wage theft suggests a
concerted decision by at least some employers in these industries to
violate the law, not simply technical violations or clerical errors. It is these
intentional violations of wage and hour laws that this Article addresses. 9

32.

Annette Bernhardt et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers: Violations of
Employment andLaborLaws in America's Cities5 (2009), http://www.nelp
.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8N9Z-EX3D].
Id.

33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 20.

35.

Id.at3.

36.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 31.

31.

37.
38.
39.
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Id.at5.
It would be difficult to effectively deter employers from committing
accidental violations of wage and hour laws. However, there may be ways of
detecting and correcting these violations. A new program recently rolled out
by DOL, called the Payroll Audit Independent Determination (PAID)
Program, is one way to identify such violations. Through PAID, employers
voluntarily submit to an audit by DOL, who will determine whether any
compliance issues exist If they do, employers are required to pay back
wages, but are not required to pay any additional penalties, such as
liquidated damages and attorney's fees. See, Wage & Hour Division, PAID
Program, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/PAID [https://perma.
cc/889A-99H5]. PAID represents a new and creative way to deal with the
problem of accidental violations, though it is unlikely to do anything to solve
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The economic impact of wage theft is devastating. A recent report by
David Cooper and Teresa Kroeger from the Economic Policy Institute (EPI)
found that in the ten most populous U.S. states, "2.4 million workers lose
$8 billion" annually from wage theft.4 0 The authors estimate that
employers steal $15 billion from workers across the country each year.41
The effect of wage theft on individual workers is severe. The EPI study
estimates that the average victim of wage theft loses $3,300 per year,
receiving only $10,500 in annual wages. 4 2 Similarly, a U.S. Department of
Labor (DOL) study found that wage theft lowers a minimum wage
worker's income by 37-49% on average when a violation occurs.4 3 This
can mean the difference between barely making ends meet and falling into
extreme poverty, particularly where workers begin making low wages.
The DOL study estimated that 67,000 families in New York and California
alone live below the poverty line because of wage theft. 4 4 In addition, wage
theft has second order effects such as increased spending on social
programs, like food stamps, 45 and possible adverse public health
outcomes. 4 6

the problem I focus on here. Employers knowingly violating wage and hour
laws are unlikely to volunteer for an audit or willingly pay employees back
wages.
40.

David Cooper & Teresa Kroeger, Employers Steal Billions from Workers'
PaychecksEach Year, ECON. POLICY INST. (May 10, 2017), http://www.epi.org/
publication/employers-steal-billions-from-workers-paychecks-each-yearsurvey-data-show-millions-of-workers-are-paid-less-than-the-minimumwage-at-significant-cost-to-taxpayers-and-state-economies
[http:// perma.cc/V9CH-MXL5].

41.

Id.

42.

Cooper &Kroeger,supranote 40.
DEP'T OF LABOR, supranote 18 at ES-3.

43.
44.
45.

Id. at ES-4.
See David Cooper, BalancingPaychecks and PublicAssistance: How Higher
Wages Would Strengthen What Government Can Do, ECON. POLICY INST.
[http://
http://www.epi.org/publication/wages-and-transfers
(2016),
perma.cc/VL78-3SXF]. A study by the UC Berkeley Labor Center has found
that the U.S. and state governments spend $152.8 billion in social programs
for the working poor. At least some percentage of these expenditures can be
attributed to wage theft See Ken Jacobs et al., Low Wages Cost US
Taxpayers $152.8 Billion Each Year in PublicSupportfor Working Families,
http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/the-high-public-cost-of-low-wages [http://
perma.cc/FN9S-2JKG]. But see Joseph Sabia & Thanh Tam Nguyen, The
Effects of Minimum Wage Increases on Means-Tested Government
Assistance, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. REs. (2015), http://www.epionline.org/wp-
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Wage theft is likely to blunt the impact of any minimum wage increase.
Researchers have found that a minimum wage increase does not result in a
corresponding increase in low-wage workers' income. Most chalk this up
to employers' decision to cut labor costs, for instance by cutting hours
when hourly wages rise.4 8 But it is also possible that part of the minimal
increase in low-income workers' wages is due to employers' wage-theft
behaviors. 4 9 Given the endemic rates of wage theft, the focus on minimum
wage increases is puzzling. To state the obvious, an increase in the
minimum wage will only benefit low-wage workers if employers comply
with the law. And yet, very little national political attention is paid to the
50
problem of wage theft, even among progressive politicians. It is a crisis
unfolding largely outside of public view.

46.

47.

48.

[https://
content/uploads/2016/01/EPIMWGovtAssistStudyV2-5.pdf
perma.cc/CQG4-56MF].
Meredith Minkler et al., Wage Theftas a NeglectedPublicHealthProblem:An
Overviewand CaseStudy From San Francisco'sChinatown District 104 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1010, 1010 (2014).
In fact, some studies show that worker income actually decreases. See, e.g.,
Jardim et al., Minimum Wage Increases, Wages, andLow- Wage Employment:
Evidence from Seattle, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. REs. 2 (2017), http://
evans.uw.edu/sites/default/files/NBER%20Working%2OPaper.pdf [http://
perma.cc/5TTM-K9P5].
Id.; David Neumark & William Wascher, Do Minimum Wages FightPoverty?,
40 ECON. INQUIRY 318, 324 (2002).

49.

50.

102

This conclusion could lead some minimum wage skeptics to argue that wage
theft is less of a problem and more of a feature of the current systemstrategic law breaking that lowers wages in industries and locations that
cannot support the higher minimum wage. Even assuming that, in certain
locations, the minimum wage is set at a level that has adverse effects on lowwage workers, wage theft is not an appropriate solution because of the
harmful secondary effects that wage theft causes.
For instance, the 2016 Democratic Party Platform prominently featured
support for a $15 minimum wage but did not contain a single reference to
wage theft. See 2016 Democratic Party Platform, DEMOCRATIC PARTY
COMMITTEE (July 8-9, 2016) http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sites/default/
files/books/presidential-documents-archive-guidebook/national-politicalparty-platforms-of-parties-receiving-electoral-votes-1840-2016/117717.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S76F-LTJE].

THE PROBLEM OF WAGE THEFT

II.

WHAT EXPLAINS THE WAGE THEFT CRISIS

Worker advocates have a clear explanation for the wage theft crisis:
greed and unequal power between workers and employers. For instance,
Kim Bobo argues that "[s]ome employers are just greedy and don't want to
share profits with their employees. Some don't view the minority or
female workers as human beings, who have the same needs and desires as
they."51 This is undoubtedly true but not sufficient to understand the
conditions under which employers decide to engage in wage theft.
Policymakers and advocates must first understand this decision-making
process if they want to solve the problem of wage theft.
Economists have long sought to explain non-compliance with wage
and hour laws as a rational profit-maximizing decision employers make in
response to low enforcement rates and weak penalties. In their seminal
1979 article, Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law Orley Ashenfelter
and Robert Smith theorized that an employer's decision to pay less than
the minimum wage involves a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account
the probability of detection, the expected penalties that would occur if
detected, and the profit the employer expects to make by violating the
law.5 2 More specifically, the benefit to an employer can be calculated by
multiplying the additional profit the employer will make if they violate the
law with the probability that the employer will escape detection.
Conversely, the cost can be calculated by multiplying the probability that
he will get caught violating the law with the amount in damages he will be
required to pay if he does get caught.53
In other words, "employers will not comply with the law if the
expected penalties are small because it is easy to escape detection or
because assessed penalties are small."5 4 As enforcement approaches zero,
51.

Bobo, supranote 21, at 50.

52.

53.

See Orley Ashenfelter & Robert Smith, Compliance with the Minimum Wage
Law 87 J. POL. ECON. 333, 336 (1979); Yang-Ming Chang & Isaac Ehrlich, On
the Economics of Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law 94 J. POL. ECON.
83, 85 (1985); Gideon Yaniv, Minimum Wage Noncompliance and the
Employment Decision, 19 J. LABOR ECON. 596, 597 (2001).
Ashenfelter and Smith predict that an employer will choose to violate the
law if: E(n) - n (M, r, p) = (1 - ?) [n (w, r, p) - n (M, r, p)] - XD> 0, where
E(n) is the expected profit if the employer choose to violate the law, n (M, r,
p) is the profit if the employer pays the minimum wage, n (w, r, p) is the
profit if the employer paid the market wage, k is the probability that an
employer will get caught violating the law and D is the penalties the
employer will have to pay if caught. Id. at 335.

54.

Id. at 336.
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rates of wage theft should skyrocket. Moreover, workers who are more
vulnerable across any number metrics will suffer from higher rates of
wage theft because employers know they risk more by complaining and
may have fewer options if they lose their job. Thus, the probability of
getting caught committing wage theft is lower and non-compliance is
higher with respect to those workers, all else being equal.55
On the other side of the equation, employers stand to gain more from
violating the law the greater the difference between the market wage and
the minimum wage, and therefore they are more likely to commit wage
theft in low-wage and low-skilled industrieS. 56 Employers are also more
likely to violate the law when labor elasticity is low, meaning that an
employer cannot easily cut labor costs by increasing efficiency.57 Thus,
wage theft rates should be higher in industries with high labor costs that
are not well suited to mechanization.5 8
These predictions are all born out in the current wage theft crisis.
Under the current enforcement regime, few employers ever get caught
committing wage theft and fewer still ever pay the price for it.
Enforcement of minimum wage and overtime laws occurs mostly through
complaints filed by individual workers,59 but most victims of wage theft

55.

56.

-

57.

See Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law
Enforcement An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1071 (2014)
(applying Ashenfelter and Smith's model to vulnerable workers who suffer
higher rates of noncompliance).
See, e.g., David Weil, Public Enforcement/PrivateMonitoring: Evaluatinga
NewApproach to Regulatingthe Minimum Wage, 58 INDUST. & LAB. REL. REV.
238 (2005) (applying Ashenfelter and Smith's model to the L.A. apparel
industry).
See Ashenfelter & Smith, supranote 532, at 336. Taking into account labor
elasticity, an employer will violate the law if L(M - w) - (L/w)[1/2(M
w)2e] > [X/(1 - ?)]Dwhere e= (3L/,w)(w/L) < 0 is the elasticity of the
demand for labor and [X/(1 - X)]D are the odds of getting caught A higher e
(elasticity of labor demand) will make it less likely that an employer will
commit wage theft, all else being equal. Likewise, a larger difference
between the minimum wage and the market wage (M - w) will make
noncompliance more profitable.
See Ashenfelter & Smith, supranote 532 at 335; see also Annette Bernhardt
et al., Employers Gone Rogue: ExplainingIndustry Variationin Violations of
Workplace Laws, 665 ILR REV. 808 (2013) (finding that small firm size, nonstandard pay systems, and lack of benefits all correlate with higher rates of
employer noncompliance with wage and hour laws).
See JAcoB MEYER & ROBERT GREENLEAF, ENFORCEMENT OF WAGE AND HOUR LAWS: A
SURVEY OF STATE REGULATORS (2011), https://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/

58.

59.

104

THE PROBLEM OF WAGE THEFT

never file a complaint.60 Many workers never know that they have been
cheated because they are uninformed about the laws that protect them. In
one study, for instance, fifty-nine percent of workers surveyed
misunderstood their minimum wage or overtime rights.6 Workers most
vulnerable to wage theft often have limited education and English
proficiency and do not have time or resources to research the laws that
protect them. Employers have no incentive to educate their employees
about their rights. Laws requiring employers to disclose certain workplace
rights to workers are routinely violated.
Even when workers know their rights, they face severe obstacles in
coming forward. Workers can file lawsuits in federal or state court,62 but
doing so requires navigating the process pro se, which is difficult and
costly, or finding a lawyer. Plaintiff-side employment lawyers do take
wage-and-hour cases on contingency, but they often cherry-pick cases
where they are likely to get large attorney's fees awards, such as class
actions and lawsuits on behalf of highly paid employees whose damages
are likely to be higher.63 Paying a private attorney out-of-pocket is
prohibitively expensive for all but the highest paid workers. Filing fees and
court costs alone might dwarf the amount that the worker might recover
in damages at the end of the case, if he or she recovers anything at all.6 4

60.

61.

default/files/microsites/career-services/Wage%2Oand%2 0Hour
%20Report0/o20FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/KPY9-BJPM].
See Gideon Yaniv, ComplainingAbout Noncompliance with Minimum Wage
Laws, 14 INT'L REV. L. EcoN. 351 (1994) (explaining that when enforcement
occurs mostly through individual complaints, an employer's decision to
comply will be based in part on how likely it is that their particular
employees will complain).
Alexander &Prasad,supranote 55, at 1093. In another survey of restaurant
workers in Philadelphia, only 38.5% of respondents knew what the legal
minimum wage was. See RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CENTER OF PHILADELPHIA ET
AL., BEHIND THE KITCHEN DOOR: THE HIDDEN REALITY OF PHILADELPHIA'S THRIVING
INDUSTRY (2012), http://rocunited.org/wp-content/uploads/
2013/04/reports-bkd-philly.pdf [http://perma.cc/DD4L-84CE].
RESTAURANT

62.
63.

64.

See29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018).
Stephen Lee, PolicingWage Theft in the Day Labor Market 4 U.C. IRVINE L.
REV. 655, 662 (2014) (lawyers are often deterred from taking wage-andhour cases from low-wage workers because of low damage amounts).
For example, the fee to file a federal lawsuit under the FLSA is $400 in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, not
including fees for service of process, which can easily exceed hundreds of
dollars. See DistrictCourtFee Schedule and Related Information, U.S. DIST.
COURT, SOUTHERN DIST. N.Y., http://nysd.uscourts.gov/fees.php
[http://
perma.cc/3UKY-PWKT]. A person working full-time making the minimum
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Many legal services offices have employment units, but these units are
more likely to focus on unemployment or worker's compensation than
wage and hour claims. And given the legal services shortage, even if all
legal services offices were fully engaged in prosecuting wage theft, their
efforts would still fall short.65
That leaves workers to file complaints with the DOL or an equivalent
state agency. The advantage of filing an administrative complaint is that it
is usually free to file and the process is easier to navigate pro se than filing
a case in court. Unfortunately, the DOL is woefully underfunded and
understaffed.6 6 Most complaints sit in lengthy queues, or worse, go
uninvestigated altogether. 7 For example, a report by the Government
Accountability Office in 2009 found that that the Wage and Hour Division
of DOL mishandled or failed to investigate nine out of ten complaints filed
by undercover researchers.6 8 State agencies are even more understaffed.

65.

66.

67.

wage in New York City who did not receive a final paycheck would be out
$520.
For example, a 2017 report by the Legal Services Corporation found that
only four percent of LSC services go towards helping people with
employment problems. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE
39 (2017),
AMERICANS
NEEDS OF Low-INCOME
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL
http://www.1sc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.
pdf [http://perma.cc/XB7Z-ED4X].
The number of DOL investigators decreased by fourteen percent between
1975 and 2004, while the number of businesses covered by FLSA rose by
more than one hundred percent Annette Bernhardt & Siobhdn McGrath,
Trends in Wage and Hour Enforcement by the US. Department of Labor,
1975-2004, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 1 (2005), http://www.nelp.org/
content/uploads/2015/03/Trends-in-Wage-and-Hour-Enforcementpdf
[http://perma.cc/M25W-D7U7].
See Department of Labor. Wage and Hour Division's ComplaintProcesses
Leave Low Wage Workers Vulnerable to Wage Theft, GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/
(2009),
OFFICE
20090325_GAOTestimony.pdf [http://perma.cc/M25W-D7U7].

68.

Id

69.

ZACH SCHILLER & SARAH DECARLO, POLICY MATTERS OHIO, INVESTIGATING WAGE
THEFT: A SURVEY OF THE STATES i (2010), http://www.fairwarning.org/wp-

content/uploads/2014/04/Link23.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P7A-37WQ]. A
study in New York State found that as of July 2013, DOL had a backlog of
14,000 cases for unpaid wages. See NYS DepartmentofLabor's Widespread
Failureto Serve Wage Theft Victims, NAT'L MOBILIZATION AGAINST SWEATSHOPS,

http://nmass.org/nys-department-of-labors-widespread-failure-to-servewage-theft-victims [http://perma.cc/TP2Q-VNWB]; see also Mandy Locke,
ForMany Workers CheatedOut of Wages, NCDepartmentofLaborOffers No

106

THE PROBLEM OF WAGE THEFT

For workers who do decide to file a complaint, additional risks
abound. Workers risk being fired, blacklisted, or retaliated against in other
ways, such as being reported to immigration authorities if they lack
immigration status. In the 2009 NELP study, forty-three percent of
workers who complained reported being retaliated against in some way.70
Such retaliation is illegal,7 ' but a claim for retaliation must proceed
through the same convoluted process as the wage claims and may take
many months or years to win. In the meantime, the worker is out of a job,
unable to pay his or her bills (or deported to his or her home country,
unable to return). Low-wage workers are less likely to have the luxury of
the time it takes to file a complaint and work their way through the
complaint process than their higher-paid counterparts. They have also
become increasingly unlikely to enjoy the protection of labor unions,
which traditionally played the role of workplace watchdog. Not
coincidentally, union density in many industries with high rates of wage
theft approaches zero. 72
Nothing about the system encourages workers to come forward to
make complaints. Quite the opposite, the system encourages workers to
take no action and accept the loss of their wages. Indeed, the research
suggests that most workers choose this path. In the 2009 NELP study, 20%
of low-wage workers had experienced a serious problem at their job in the
last year but had chosen not to complain.7 4 Of these workers, 51% were
worried that they would be fired if they complained, 10% believed their
hours would be cut, and 36% did not complain because they didn't think it
would make any difference. 75 Another study by David Weil and Amanda
Pyles found that only one in 130 workers who experience an overtime
violation come forward to make a complaint and that workers are less
likely to complain in industries with the highest levels of violations. For
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Nov. 22, 2014), http://www.charlotteobserver
.com/news/business/article9235580.html [http://perma.cc/MDP2-6JSV].
Bernhardtetal., supranote 31, at 25.

Help,

71.
72.

73.
74.
75.
76.

29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2018).
Compare Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members - 2016,
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [http://perma.cc/PLE38KVR] with Bernhardt et al., supranote 31, at 4.
Yaniv, supranote 60, at 353.
Bernhardt et al., supranote 31, at 24.
Id.
David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and
the Problem of Enforcement in the US. Workplace, 27 COMP. LABOR LAW
POL'YJ. 59, 82 (2006).
&

70.
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their part, employers understand that the odds that one of their employees
will file a claim against them is miniscule," and that they can decrease the
likelihood of that happening by retaliating against any worker who does
complain.
When an enforcement system depends almost entirely on worker
complaints, and the complaint rate remains abysmally low, then
Ashenfelter and Smith's model predicts low compliance rates unless the
penalties paid are very high.7 8 But the current enforcement regime falls
short here, too. Even if employers are caught committing wage theft, they
almost never pay more than the unpaid wages they owe and in many cases
pay substantially less than they owe or nothing at all. As the National
Employment Law Project has explained:
Employers know that if they fail to pay wages, the worst that may
happen is that they will eventually have to pay the bare amount of
wages owed. In effect this amounts to a free loan. If there are no
consequences to violating the law beyond nominal penalties,
employers experience no "lesson learned." They simply do not
have sufficient incentive to comply with the law.79
This is the case despite the fact that the Fair Labor Standards Act and
some state labor statutes provide for substantial penalties to deter
employers from committing wage theft. Workers can recover double
damages under federal law and some state laws." They can also recover
attorney's fees and court costs,81 which is supposed to both encourage

77.

David Weil's estimate that a non-complying employer has a 10% chance of
being investigated by DOL each year may be too high. David Weil, Public
Enforcement/PrivateMonitoring:Evaluatinga New Approach to Regulating
the Minimum Wage, 58 INDUS. LAB. REL. REv. 238, 242 (2005). In 2010, DOL
completed 10,529 investigations where violations of minimum wage laws
were found. Fiscal Year Data for WHD, U.S. DEP'T LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/whd/data/datatables.htm#panel2 [https://perma.cc/
4Y2E-RLZG]. That same year, there were almost twenty-eight million
businesses in the United States. See FAQs, SMALL Bus. ADMIN.,
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/FAQ-Sept_2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GQQ8-S44E], for an investigation rate of 3.7%.

78.

SeeAshenfelter &Smith, supranote 52, at 336.

79.

NAT'L EMP. LAW PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE'S GUIDE TO STATE
AND CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT WAGE THEFT

JUSTICE].

80.

29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018).

81.

Id.
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workers to file lawsuitS 8 2 and further deter employers from violating the
law."'
Yet these penalties have not translated into effective deterrence. First,
the statute of limitations for wage claims under federal law is two years
(three years if the violation is willful).84 Even if a worker complains, some
of the wages he or she is owed is likely to be outside the statute of
limitations and therefore unrecoverable in all but the shortest
employment relationships. Employers know that even if they do get
caught, much of what they owe will be wiped away because of the statute
of limitations.
Moreover, civil cases are likely to settle for far less than the amount
the employers would owe if the cases went all the way to judgment.
Because DOL lacks resources to bring every worker complaint to trial, it
routinely settles cases on workers' behalf for pennies on the dollar. Most
private lawsuits also end in settlement as wells and workers have many
incentives to accept less than they are owed. Some of these incentives are
common to all civil litigation. Litigation is time-intensive. A worker may
have to spend countless hours meeting with his or her attorney, attending
court and mediations, and prepping for trial. The civil litigation process is
long and it often takes years to see a case through to trial. Workers may
prefer quick settlements that allow them to avoid the time and expense
required to get a judgment.
Then there is the uncertainty of trial itself and possibility that the
worker will be left with nothing because of an unsympathetic jury or
judge. Many employers who commit wage theft pay their employees off
the books and in cash to avoid detection. This means that wage theft
cases often come down to a he-said, she-said on what the worker was paid.
82.

Percival & Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public Interest
Litigation, 47 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (1984).

83.
84.
85.

86.

Thomas D. Rowe, The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee-Shifting A Critical
Overview1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 660 (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (2018).
Adam Liptak, US. Suits Multiply, But FewerEver Get to Trial, Study Says, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/14/us/us-suitsmultiply-but-fewer-ever-get-to-trial-study-says.html
[https://perma.cc/
88GD-XJEE] (finding that only 1.8% of civil cases went to trial in 2002).
See Steven Greenhouse, Dozens of Companies Underpay or Misreport
Workers, State Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/
2008/02/12/nyregion/121abor.html
[http://perma.cc/DS7Z-45J4]
(reporting on enforcement action that found dozens of companies paying
workers "off the books" to avoid paying taxes and to avoid detention of labor
violations).
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A low-wage worker who lives close to or below the poverty line may need
the money a quick settlement will bring and be economically unable to
wait for a better offer.8 7 All of these factors may lead a worker to accept a
settlement that is far less than what he or she is owed.
Neither is obtaining a wage judgment a guarantee that the worker will
see any money. Unable to win on the merits, many employers engage in a
variety of tricks to avoid paying wage judgments, including filing for
bankruptcy, transferring assets to third parties, closing8 8 or selling the
business for little or no remuneration, or in some cases disappearing
altogether. A recent report by the Community Development Project of the
Urban Justice Center identified $125 million in unpaid wage judgements
between 2003 and 2013 in New York alone. 9 Another study out of
California found that only seventeen percent of wage judgments in that
state were paid from 2008 to 2011.90
In one such case, five workers in Manhattan sued their former
employer, a restaurant operating under the name Charm Thai, for unpaid
minimum wage and overtime violations and illegal retaliation in 2011. A
court awarded the workers a judgment in the amount of $830,000. The
owners, a husband and wife team, responded by closing several of their
businesses, transferring assets between them, and eventually declaring
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy filing put a stop to all collection efforts,
87.

88.

Many researchers have examined how being poor is costly because poverty
pushes people into making economically disadvantageous decisions. See,
e.g., A. Yesim Orhun & Mike Palazzolo, Frugalityis Hardto Afford (working
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2742431
paper),
[http://perma.cc/7M9N-LRQQ] (finding that the poor are unable to take
advantage of some cost-saving measures such as bulk buying and waiting to
buy when there are sales); It's Expensive to Be Poor: Why Low-Income
Americans Often Have to Pay More, ECONOMIST (Sept 3, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21663262-why-low-incom
e-americans-often-have-pay-more-its-expensive-be-poor
[http://perma.cc/8ALF-2587] (discussing how poverty drives people to
utilize high-cost strategies such as pay day lenders).
See, e.g, Jim Dwyer, Another Voice foins ChorusforFairPay N.Y. TIMES (June
10, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/nyregion/another-voicejoins-chorus-for-fair-pay.html [http://perma.cc/3BYL-V3WN] (citing case of
restaurant in New York that closed six months after the complaint was filed).

89.

See Empty Judgments: The Wage Collection Crisisin New York 5 (2014),
NAT'L CTR. L. ECON. JUST., http://nclej.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/
Empty-Judgments-The-Wage-Collection-Crisis-in-New-York.pdf
[http://perma.cc/ULY7-KXEY] [hereinafterEmptyJudgments].

90.

See EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO ET AL., HOLLOW VICTORIES: THE CRISIS IN COLLECTING
UNPAID WAGES FOR CALIFORNIA'S WORKERS
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allowing the pair to drain all assets out of their businesses and disappear.
The workers never received a dime from the judgment. 91
The inability to collect on wage judgments gives workers further
incentive to forgo filing complaints at all, or if they do file a complaint,
gives them an incentive to settle early and for much less than they are
owed. In these cases, the employer's gamble has still paid off; in the worst
case scenario, they end up paying less than they would have if they had
complied with the law. In the best case scenario, they pay nothing at all.
Very rarely, an employer is forced to pay full back-wages and penalties.
But this happens so seldomly that it has very little effect on employers who
decide to violate the law.
As Noah Zatz has explained, some employers act in open defiance of
the law and "accept[ expected remedies as the cost of doing business."92
These employers may continue to violate the law even after paying a
settlement or court judgment. In one recent high-profile example, Grand
Sichuan, a popular Chinese restaurant in lower Manhattan, was sued in
2012 for minimum wage violations and tip stealing. In response, the
restaurant fired several of the complaining workers.93 The restaurant
settled the case in 2013 and rehired the workers as part of the settlement.
However, the restaurant eventually reneged on the terms of the settlement
agreement and continued to pay less than the minimum wage. Several
workers were fired again in 2014 for organizing against the employer.9 4
The workers filed a second lawsuit, which Grand Sichuan agreed to settle
before reneging on the agreement several months later. After the National
Labor Relations Board found that Grand Sichuan had unlawfully

91.
92.

Emptyjudgments, supranote 89, at 12.
Noah Zatz, Working Beyond the Reach or Grasp of Employment Law, in
ANNETTE BERNHARDT, HEATHER BOUSHEY, LAURA DRESSER, & CHRIS TILLY, THE
GLOVES-OFF ECONOMY, WORKPLACE STANDARDS AT THE BOTTOM OF AMERICA'S LABOR
MARKET 43 (2008).

93.

94.

See East Village GrandSichuan Inc v. Chinese Staff& Workers Ass'n, No. 02CA-086946, 1, 5-6 (Nov. 6, 2013), http://hr.cch.com/ELD/EastVillage.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2SGF-PHSZ].
Rob Scher, Ex- Workers Picket Grand Sichuan as Wage Dispute Rages On,
BEDFORD & BOWERY (July 2, 2015), http://bedfordandbowery.com/2015/
07/ex-workers-picket-grand-sichuan-as-wage-dispute-rages-on
[https://
perma.cc/XL46-BLJ3]; Jessica Warriner, Former Grand Sichuan Workers
Brave Bitter Cold To CallForRestaurantBoycott GOTHAMIST (Jan. 8, 2015),
http://gothamist.com/2015/01/08/grand-sichuan-protest.php
[https://perma.cc/3CX4-BCUY].
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terminated one of the workers,9 5 the restaurant closed (the owner still
owns and operates several other branches of the restaurant in New
York). The workers still have not received their wages.
In another example, Goodfellas Restaurant in New Haven, Connecticut
paid back wages to workers as part of Department of Labor investigations
in 2009 and 2010,9' just to be sued by workers in 2015 for engaging in the
same illegal conduct. 98 In each case, the restaurant reorganized under a
different corporation owned by the same couple. 99 During negotiations
with the workers, owner Gary lannoconne admitted that
he would continue to pay less than the minimum wage because "he
could get away with it" and "that's the way business works in
America." He said the penalties from the seven DOL
investigations-a few thousand dollars for multiple wage
violations against at least 60 workers-were like a slap on the
wrist.' 00
Most employers do not make the mistake of saying this out loud, but
this type of calculus happens in businesses across the country every day.
Policy interventions, therefore, must seek to make wage theft
unprofitable. Such interventions can either step up enforcement of wage
and hour laws, thereby raising the probability that any particular
employer will be caught committing wage theft, or they can increase
penalties paid by employers, thereby raising the potential costs employers
East Village Grand Sichan Inc, 364 N.L.R.B., No. 151 (Nov. 30, 2016),
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.aabany.org/resource/resmgr/BoardDecisi
on.pdf [https://perma.cc/WGQ3-JJFM].
96. EV Grieve, GrandSichuan Has Closed on St. Mark's Place (Nov. 2, 2016),
http://evgrieve.com/2016/11/grand-sichuan-has-closed-on-st-marks.html
[https://perma.cc/U7QQ-88QP].
97. Complaint, Perez v. Goodfellas Caf6 LLC, 3:15-cv-00642 ¶¶ 24-29 (D. Conn.
May 1, 2015); Thomas MacMillan, Goodfellas Gives In, NEw HAVEN INDEP.
(May 2, 2011), http://www.newhavenindependentorg/index.php/archives/
entry/goodfellas.givesin [http://perma.cc/HWD5-Q5F7].
98. Mary O'Leary, New Haven's Goodfellas Restaurant Sued Over Alleged
Worker Violations, NEw HAVEN REG. (May 3, 2015), http://www.nhregister
[http://perma.cc/HK85.com/article/NH/20150503/NEWS/150509945
D5M2].
99. I was counsel of record for Plaintiffs in both the Grand Sichuan and
Goodfellas cases at certain points in the litigation.
100. Unidad Latina en Acci6n, The Connecticut Wage Theft Crisis:Stories and
Solutions 6 (2015), https://ulanewhaven.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/
03/Wage-Theft-Report.pdf [http://perma.cc/BE2W-XFGE].
95.
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would pay if caught committing wage theft. The amount of penalties that
an employer pays can be increased either by increasing the amount of de
jure penalties available under the law or by increasing the amount of de
facto penalties an employer pays by strengthening judgment collection
mechanisms. As Ashenfelter and Smith make clear, these two factorsenforcement and penalties-must be thought of in relation to each other. If
penalties are very low, then the probability of getting caught must be very
high to encourage compliance. If enforcement rates are very low then
penalties must be very severe to reach the same result.
The benefits to committing wage theft, on the other hand, depend on
factors that do not lend themselves to easy or effective policy
interventions, such as the market rate for labor and labor elasticity. Thus,
policymakers seeking to deter violations of minimum wage laws are left
with two main strategies-increasing penalties and strengthening
enforcement.
III. EXISTING POLICY REFORMS

Though little attention is paid to the problem of wage theft nationally,
there has been more activity at the local level. Worker centers and other
non-traditional labor organizationso have spearheaded public campaigns
across certain (mostly urban) geographic areas. 10 2 They have also sought
to amend state and local laws to address wage theft on a systemic level.os
The fight against wage theft has been "both a cause and a consequence of
the burgeoning alt-labor movement: workers' rights groups have led the
charge to enact stronger laws at the state level while their resulting policy
campaigns have provided the impetus for further coalition- and
movement-building." 104

101. See JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE

DREAM 2 (2006); Josh Eidelson, Alt-Labor, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013),
http://prospectorg/article/alt-labor [https://perma.cc/XK26-N9XM].
102. See Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law 29 CARDozo L. REV.

2685, 2723 (2008).
103. See Marc Doussard & Ahmad Gamal, The Rise of Wage Theft Laws: Can
Community-Labor Coalitions Win Victories in State Houses? 52 URB. AFF.
REV. 780, 781 (2015)
104. Daniel Galvin, DeterringWage Theft: Alt-Labor, StatePolitics, andthe Policy
Determinants of Minimum Wage Compliance, 14 PERSP. ON POL. 324, 326
(2016).
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Local Wage Theft Laws

Two-hundred and fifty-five wage theft laws were introduced at the
state level between 2004 and 2012,105 with a dozen major wage theft laws
being passed during this or similar periods.1 0 6 These laws have typically
taken one of two forms: either they increase penalties available under the
law for employers caught committing wage theft, or they seek to facilitate
collection of wage judgments from noncomplying employers.
When local and state governments have increased penalties, they have
largely done so by increasing the monetarypenalties for violating the law.
This is one of the easier reforms to pass because civil penalties already
exist in the law in many states, 10 7 and doing so has no direct consequences
on state budgets. Eight states now have treble damages provisions for
minimum wage claims and/or wage non-payment claims: Arizona, Idaho,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, Ohio and Rhode
Island. 108 Some localities have also passed increased penalties for wage
and hour violations, particularly in states with weak enforcement regimes
such as Florida, where Miami-Dade County passed treble damages for

105. See Doussard &Gamal, supra note 1033, at 781.
106. See Galvin, supranote 104, at 336.
107. See Lauren K. Dasse, Wage Theft in New York. The Wage Theft Prevention
Act as a Counter to an Endemic Problem, 16 CUNY L. REV. 97, 114 (2012)
(noting that twenty-one states already allow for double damages in wage
and hour claims).

108. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-364(g) (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-615
(West 2016); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, §§ 626-A, 670 (West 2012); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ch. 151, § 1B, 20 (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN. LAB. & EMPL. § 3-507.1;
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 408.488 (West 2012); N.M. STAT ANN. § 50-4- 26(c) (West
2012); OHIO CONST. art. II
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wage claims in 2010.109 In 2013, the District of Columbia became the first
jurisdiction to approve quadrupledamages for unpaid wage claims.110
Other states have increased penalties in the form of civil fines payable
to the state. For instance, in 2010, the State of Washington increased the
minimum civil penalty for wage non-payment from $500 to $1000 per
violation.1 ' That same year, Iowa passed a bill that increased civil
penalties for non-compliant employers fivefold from $100 to $500 per
violation.11 2 Though these fines seem small, every week an employee
suffers a wage violation is a separate violation, meaning that an employer
who has failed to pay fifteen employees the minimum wage for a year
would be on the hook for $390,000 if $500 per violation is levied.
States and localities have also begun to experiment with non-monetary
penalties in an attempt to deter employers from violating wage and hour
laws. The two most common types of penalties in this category are
individual criminal liability for wage theft and revocation of business
licenses for non-complying employers. Criminal liability for "theft of
services" has existed in many states under statutes that pre-date the
recent push for wage theft legislation,"13 but there have been attempts to
clarify the laws or increase criminal penalties for such conduct. For
instance, Texas recently amended its theft of services statute to make clear
that an employer can be criminally prosecuted for "theft of services" even
if he pays part of the wages due." 4 In 2011, New York increased criminal

109. Miami Dade Wage Theft Ordinance, Miami-Dade Municipal Code 22-2(h).
The State of Florida dismantled the state's Department of Labor and
Employment Security (DOLES) in 2000 and the Attorney General's Office, the
agency tasked with enforcing the state's wage and hour laws, has not held an
employer responsible for violating the laws since 2011. See Spencer
Woodman, FloridaHas Not Held an Employer Responsiblefor Violating the
Minimum Wage Since 2011, NATION (July 11, 2016), https://
www.thenation.com/article/florida-has-not-held-an-employer-responsiblefor-violating-the-minimum-wage-since-2011
[https://perma.cc/A9PL-3SF2].
110. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1303 (West 2015). Other states, such as New York,
have considered and rejected treble damages for wage and hour claims.
111. See 2010 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 42 (S.H.B. 3145) (West 2010).
112. See 2009 IA. LEGIS. SERV. CH. 49 (H.F. 618) (West 2009).
113. WINNING WAGE JUSTICE, supranote 79, at 111 (forty-five states and the District
of Columbia either have theft of services provisions in their larceny statutes
or criminalize some violations of the state's labor law).
114. See Haleigh Svoboda, Austin OfficialsAnnounce Crackdown on Wage Theft,
TEX. TRIB. (Nov. 11, 2011), https://www.texastribune.org/2011/11/17/
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penalties for minimum wage violations to a maximum of $20,000 per
violation and up to a year imprisonment.1 1 s Campaigns to allow revocation
of business licenses have mostly occurred at the local level, since localities
are often responsible for issuing many business licenses. For example, in
2013, Chicago passed the Anti-Wage Theft Ordinance, which allowed the
city to revoke the business license of any employer found guilty of wage
theft. 1 6 Cities and counties in Florida and New Jersey have since passed
similar ordinances.
A second way that states have sought to address the wage theft crisis
is by improving wage judgment collection mechanisms. The most common
of these mechanisms is the wage lien, which allows workers to place a lien
on an employer's property for the amount of unpaid wages due. The wage
lien is modelled on the mechanic's lien, which has long allowed workers in
the construction industry to place a lien on an employer's property to
obtain unpaid wages.' 18 A wage lien prevents an employer from moving or
hiding assets to avoid paying an eventual judgment, and encourages
employers to settle wage claims early. Ten states currently have some
texas-officials-announce-crackdown-wage-theft
[https://perma.cc/Z67P-YTL6].
115. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 662 (West 2016). The 2011 Wage Theft Prevention Act
was the result of a years-long campaign spearheaded. by Make the Road New
York, a community organization based out of New York City. See Jane
McAlevey, Make the RoadNew York Success Through 'Love andAgitation,
NATION (May 22, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/mAke-roadnew-york-success-through-love-and-agitation
[https://perma.cc/MW6A-8H8M].
116. See Anti-Wage Theft Ordinance Passes City Council Unanimously, ARISE
CHICAGO (Feb. 18, 2015), http://arisechicago.org/anti-wage-theft-ordinancepasses-unanimously [https://perma.cc/UX77-YWWL]; Josh Eidelson, Big
Win For Labor in Chicago, SALON (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.salon.com/
2013/01/18/bigwin-forlabor inchicago/ [https://perma.cc/SN7K-8J4Z].
117. See Alan Pyke, FloridaCounty Makes It EasierFor Workers To Get Unpaid
Wages From Bosses, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 24, 2015), http://thinkprogress
.org/florida-county-makes-it-easier-for-workers-to-get-unpaid-wages-frombosses-de505088096b [https://perma.cc/WM9S-HG7M] (citing Osceola,
Florida's law that allows revocation of business licenses for employers found
to have committed wage theft); Hank Kalet, Business Groups, Worker
Advocates at Odds Over Local Wage-Theft' Laws, N.J. SPOTLIGHT (July 24,
2015), https://www.njspotlight.com/stories/15/07/24/business-groupsworker-advocates-at-odds-over-local-wage-theft-laws
[https://perma.cc/D46N-EDSY] (citing laws in Jersey City, Newark,
Princeton, Highland Park, and New Brunswick).
118. All states currently have mechanic's liens. See CHO ET AL., supranote 90, at 16.
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form of wage lien,"' though they vary considerably in how broad they
are. 12 0 Wisconsin's wage lien-one of the oldest and broadest in the
country1 2 '-allows a worker or the Department of Labor to place a lien on
the personal or real property of employers for up to six months of unpaid
wages (up to $3,000).122 The Wisconsin lien has served as a model for
other campaigns across the country, including in Maryland, which passed
its own wage lien in 2013.123 Wage lien campaigns in New York and
California are underway: a coalition of worker advocates in New York have
advocated (so far unsuccessfully) for the passage of the Securing Wages
Earned Against Theft (SWEAT) Act. 12 4
B.

Wage Theft Laws'Effectiveness

The push for these wage theft laws comes from the recognition that
penalties are not currently high enough nor certain enough to deter
employer noncompliance. If double damages do not adequately deter
employers from violating the law, then perhaps treble damages or
increased civil fines will. If civil penalties are not sufficient, maybe the
threat of criminal liability and incarceration will do the trick. On its face,
this logic seems unimpeachable, and indeed, the Ashenfelter and Smith
model predicts that these new penalties should have an effect. 125 Likewise,
if employers know that they will have to pay wage judgments, and that
they won't be able to engage in tricks to evade collection, then the risk of
119. Alaska Stat. § 34.35.440, § 34.35.445 (West 2014); Idaho Code Ann. § 45-620
(West 2016); Ind. Code § 32-28-12-1 (West 2002); N.H. Rev. Stat Ann. §
275:51 (West 2005); Ohio Rev. Code. Ann. § 1311.34 (West 1979); Tenn.
Code Ann. § 66-13-101 (West 2010); Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 61.081 (West
1993); Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 61.0825 (West 2001); Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §
61.051 (West 2017); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 49.48.084, § 49.48.086 (West
2010); Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 109.09 (West 2018); Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. §
3-1101, et seq. (West 2013).
120. See CHO ET AL., supranote 90, at 22 n.33 (noting that some state's liens are
limited to employers in particular industries or require a finding by the
state's labor agency before a lien can be placed).
121. See Emptyludgments, supranote 899, at 17.
122. See Wisc. Stat Ann. § 109.09 (West 2018).
123. Md. Code Ann., Lab. &Empl. § 3-1104 (West 2013); VICTORYfor Maryland's
Low- Wage Workers., https://populardemocracy.org/impact/victorymary
lands-low-wage-workers [https://perma.cc/9QAP-F2TS].
124. Seehttp://www.sweatnys.org [https://perma.cc/L3GR-WG6Y].
125. SeeAshenfelter and Smith, supranote 52.
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committing wage theft goes up, and non-compliance with wage and hour
laws should go down.
Indeed, anecdotal evidence about the effects of these new wage theft
laws is overwhelmingly positive. For instance, after Miami-Dade County in
Florida passed its treble damages provision, the county handled almost
2000 cases of wage theft and recovered almost $3 million in unpaid
wages. 126 One study found that the Wisconsin wage lien has allowed
workers to recover fifty-five percent of money wage judgments compared
27
to only seventeen percent in California, which does not have a wage lien.'
Wage theft laws no doubt made a difference to individual workers who
were able to recover unpaid wages because of the new laws. But there is
little evidence that these laws made more than a small dent in the wage
theft crisis overall. A recent study by Daniel Galvin found that most wage
theft laws passed in the last ten years have had no statistical effect on
wage theft rates. 1 2 8 The only exception was in states that had enacted
treble damages provisions. In these states, he found a small, but
statistically significant decline in wage violations. 129 Even in these states,
however, workers faced a significant risk of being a victim of a minimum
wage violation each year. 13 0 Ashenfelter and Smith's model helps us
understand why this is so. Even when employers face higher penalties for
committing wage theft-either because the penalties themselves are
higher or because it is more likely that if caught an employer will have to
pay the penalty-compliance rates will remain low if the odds of getting
caught remain miniscule.
Take treble damages provisions as an example. A move from double to
treble damages means that an employer's potential loss if caught
committing wage theft will rise fifty percent. If an employer fails to pay
workers $50,000 in wages, an employer's potential liability rises from
$100,000 to $150,000, a substantial increase. However, when you take into
account the probability of getting caught-which remains very low-the

126. See Laura Huizar, Effective Strategies and Tools for Wage Enforcement:
Hearingbefore the NewJerseySenate Labor Committee, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT
(June 6, 2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Testimony-EffectiveWage-Enforcement-New-Jersey.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQ5G-ZD4A].
127.

CHO ET AL.,

supra note 90, at 13, 17.

128. See Daniel Galvin; DeterringWage Theft: Alt-Labor, State Politics, and the
Policy Determinants of Minimum Wage Compliance, 14 PERSP. ON POL. 324,
339 (2016).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 334.
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deterrence effect all but disappears.1 31 In other words, the cost of
committing wage theft in a treble damages state is higher, but the expected
benefit to the employer is greater than the expected cost in both statesby a lot. In fact, at a four percent detection rate-a reasonable estimate of
the probability that an employer will be subject to a federal DOL
investigation in a given yearl 32-damages would need to exceed twentyfour times the unpaid wages owed in order for the cost-benefit analysis to
come out in favor of compliance.13 3 Given this reality, the wage theft crisis
is less surprising than the fact that any employer decides to comply with
the law at all.
In addition, these new damages provisions operate at the state and
local level where enforcement rates are often even lower than the
nationwide average. Iowa, for example, doubled civil fines for employers
caught committing wage theft.134 Yet Iowa is one of three states in the
country with only one wage and hour investigator for the whole state. 13 5 In
other words, state enforcement in Iowa is effectively non-existent,
meaning that an increase in penalties-even a substantial increase-in
unlikely to make a difference. The Galvin study confirmed that increased
civil fines such as Iowa's have no effect on wage theft rates. 1 3 6

131. Let us assume there is a four percent chance of getting caught committing
wage theft. An employer in a double damages state calculates the cost of
committing wage theft at $4,000 ($100,000 multiplied by four percent)
whereas he calculates the benefit of not complying with the law at $48,000
($50,000 multiplied by ninety-six percent). An employer in a treble damages
state calculates his cost at $6,000 ($150,000 multiplied by four percent); the
expected benefit remains the same at $48,000.
132. See supra note 77. In addition, assuming a detection rate of four percent
obscures the difference in enforcement that exists depending on industry,
employer type, and worker characteristics.
133. An employer would have to pay $1.2 million for failing to pay workers
$50,000 if damages were set at 24 times the amount of unpaid wages. At a
four percent detection rate, the employer's "cost" would be priced at
$48,000. The potential benefit would remain the same as the above example,
$48,000. In this scenario, the benefits of compliance would equal the cost of
violating the law.
134. See 2009 Ia. Legis. Serv. Ch. 49 (H.F. 618) (West 2009).
135. See Colin Gordon, Matthew Glasson, Jennifer Sherer and Robin ClarkBennett, Wage Theft in Iowa, IOWA POL'Y PROJECT, 17 (2012), http://www
.iowapolicyproject.org/2012docs/120827-wagetheft.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X6GV-THEN].
136. See Galvin, supranote 128, at 341.
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Wage judgment collection mechanisms suffer from much the same
problem. They undoubtedly help individual workers collect on wage
judgments, as the Wisconsin study showed. 3 7 But the study also revealed
the limits of such mechanisms on raising compliance rates across the
board. Even with the wage lien, workers only successfully collected
twenty-five percent of the wages they were owed; seventy-five percent
went uncollected. 3 8 Even though Wisconsin law allows for double
damages for wage claims, workers collect only one eighth of that amount.
Under these circumstances, employers still have a strong incentive to
commit wage theft.
A similar problem plagues criminal wage theft statutes. Imposing
39
criminal liability has the potential to provide a strong deterrent effect.
But despite the laws on the books, very few wage theft prosecutions have
occurred. One study found only eleven wage theft prosecutions between
2011 and 2013 in the entire country. 140 With millions of noncomplying
employers in the country, the odds of getting convicted for committing
4
wage theft are similar to the odds of getting hit by lightning' -in other
words, not high enough to change anyone's behavior.
Private enforcement remains a possibility, of course. But, as discussed
above, private enforcement is most likely to benefit higher wage workers
with than it is low-wage workers making a sub-minimum wage or getting
cheated out of wages they were promised. And private enforcement plays
no role in levying civil fines, prosecuting employers under criminal wage

137.

CHO ET AL.,

supranote 90, at 16.

138. Id. at 18.
139. See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A
BehavioralScience Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 173, 173 (2004),
https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/1352-does-criminal-law-deterrobinson-and-darley-edited [https://perma.cc/H3WW-8WVC] ("Having a
criminal justice system that imposes liability and punishment for violations
deters.").
140. There are 28 million businesses in the United States, see supra note 77, and
an average of 3.66 wage theft prosecutions per year for a rate of 1 in 7.6
million. Winning Wagejustice:A Summary ofCriminalProsecutionsof Wage
Theft in the United States, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT (2013),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/Crim-ProsecutionsWWJ.pdf [https://perma.cc/SYF2-3HSN].
141. The odds of getting hit by lightning are approximately 1 in 700,000 each
year. Flash Facts About Lightning NAT'L GEOGRAPHIc, http://news.
nationalgeographic.com/news/2004/06/06 2 3_040623_1ightningfacts.html
[https://perma.cc/4WF4-LB3U].
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theft laws, or revoking business licenses, all of which require the
participation of a state actors.
There are a couple of reasons why most wage theft laws focused on
increased penalties and better collection mechanisms even though they do
little to increase compliance with wage and hour laws. First, the campaigns
to pass such laws are typically led by labor advocacy groups such as
worker centers with support from unions and workers' rights lawyers.14 2
Such actors may not be thinking about the problem from a systemic
perspective. Instead, they draw lessons from individual cases of wage
theft. For example, a workers' rights attorney may be thinking about what
could increase his or her leverage in settlement negotiations (treble
damages) or how to ensure he or she gets paid at the end of the day (wage
lien). A worker center may have an active campaign against an employer
in which a judgment goes unpaid, and may focus on punitive measures
such as criminal liability or business license revocation as a way of
expressing moral outrage at the employer's illegal behavior. Indeed, the
campaigns for such wage theft laws are often replete with tales of
individual workers who would have benefited from the proposed legal
reform.14 3
Such stories should not be disregarded. Increased penalties and
collection mechanisms are an important part of an effective enforcement
regime, and even in the absence of more enforcement, they can be effective
tools for individual workers to recover wages they are owed. Yet, it should
be clear by now that the current legal reforms by themselves are
insufficient to address the wage theft crisis by themselves.
IV.

THE MISSING PIECE: ENFORCEMENT

Despite the importance of enforcement, very few wage theft
campaigns have focused their efforts there. One reason for this is that
enforcement is expensive. Moving from double to treble damages for wage
claims does not affect the state budget. Indeed, in the case of civil fines,
reforms have the possibility of increasing state revenue. Conversely, more
enforcement requires resources in the form of additional personnel and
funding for enforcement activities, which may be politically impractical in
the current fiscal climate. In addition, workers' advocates often distrust
the state and federal labor agencies and do not want to focus on pushing

142. Seesupranotes 101-102.
143. See, e.g., http://www.sweatnys.org/workers-stories [https://pema.cc/PS7DDKN2].
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reforms to their enforcement activities. However, without rethinking how
our wage and hour laws are enforced, the crisis will continue unabated.
What would an effective enforcement regime look like? An obvious
place to start would be to increase the number of investigators at the state
and federal labor agencies. States vary considerably in the extent to which
they devote resources to enforcing their wage and hour laws. A recent
study found that there is one state investigator for every 146,000 workers
in the United States. 4 4 Of course, this figure obscures enormous
differences between states. Some states, such as Alabama and Delaware,
have no state enforcement of their wage and hour laws.1 4 5 Others, such as
New York and California, have relatively robust enforcement.' 4 6 However,
all states could benefit from more investigators given the magnitude of the
wage theft crisis.
The same dearth of investigators exists at the federal level. The
number of U.S. DOL investigators peaked in 942 at 1998 before falling to
731 in 2008 at the end of the Bush Administration. 4 7 Under the leadership
of Obama-era Administrator David Weil, the number of investigators
increased to over one thousand,1 48 an accomplishment that the Trump
Administration is unlikely to match.1 4 9 But even this increase failed to keep
pace with the U.S. economy. On a per capita basis, the U.S. DOL would need
2,232 investigators to have the same enforcement power as it did in
1975.150

144. See SCHILLER & DECARLO, supranote 69.
145. Id at 8.

146. Id. (146 and 395 full-time investigators, respectively).
147. See David Weil, Improving Workplace Conditions Through Strategic
Enforcement: A Report to the Wage and Hour Division (2010),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V8BS-35NE].
148. See Alana Semuels, The Future of the Departmentof Labor Under Trump,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2017/03/the-department-of-labor-under-trump/518307
[https://perma.cc/3KWP-SRST] (interview with David Weil).
149. The Administration's proposed budget issued on March 16 cut the DOL's
budget by 21%. See Ben Penn, Trump Wants 21 Percent Cut in Labor
Department Budget BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.bna
.com/trump-wants-21-n57982085353 [https://perma.cc/TJ47-TH6J].
150. These numbers come from Bernhardt and McGrath, supra note 66 and
recent statistics on the number of establishments in the United States by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, https://www.bls.gov/cew/data.htm [https://
perma.cc/HJu8-8VUR].
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It is difficult to determine what would constitute an optimal number of
federal investigators, and at some point there may be diminishing returns,
with each additional investigator bringing in less recovery for workers, but
there is no danger of hitting the point of diminishing returns anytime soon.
As the number of investigators grew by thirty percent in the Weil era, the
amount of wages collected almost tripled. 15 A return to 1975 enforcement
levels would substantially increase the deterrent effect of wage and hour
enforcement.
However, returning enforcement to previous levels will not solve the
wage theft crisis. Ashenfelter and Smith found minimum wage compliance
stood at sixty-nine percent for the country as a whole in 1973,152 hardly a
sign of a golden age of compliance with wage and hour laws.1 53
Some efforts to reform wage and hour enforcement have taken place
at the federal level. Before becoming Administrator in 2014, David Weil
issued a 112-page report on how to improve the U.S. DOL's enforcement of
wage and hour laws,15 4 and he worked to implement some of the
recommendations in the report after he took the job.15s But similar
reforms largely have not occurred at the state level. This is problematic for
several reasons. First, the U.S. DOL cannot enforce state labor laws, which
often cover more employers' 5 6 and are more generous to workers 57 than
the federal law. Second, states can continue to enforce wage and hour laws
151. See

Fiscal
Year
Data
for
WHD,
U.S.
DEP'T
LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/whd/data/datatables.htm#panel3 [https://perma.cc/
3RT8-SFFQ].
152. SeeAshenfelter and Smith, supranote 52, at 343.
153. In fact, recent studies have found higher compliance rates than Ashenfelter
and Smith found. See Bernhardt et al., supra note 31 at 2 (reporting
compliance rate of seventy-four precent); Galvin, supra note 104, at 334
(finding compliance rate of 78-86% depending on the state).
154. See David Weil, Improving Workplace Conditions Through Strategic
Enforcement:A Reportto the Wage andHourDivision,U.S. DEP'T LABOR (May
2010),
https://www.dol.gov/whd/resources/strategicEnforcement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4UN4-X577].
155. See Semuels, supranote 148 (detailing the policies he implemented as WHD
Administrator).
156. For instance, FLSA only applies to enterprises with more than $500,000 per
year in sales, which excludes many small businesses. See 29 U.S.C. § 203
(2018).
157. FLSA allows states to set higher minimum wages, 29 U.S.C. § 218 (2018), and
29 states and the District of Columbia have. See Minimum Wage Laws in the
States -July 1, 2017 U.S. DEP'T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/
america.htm [https://perma.cc/YE5Z-XZUX].
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even when federal priorities change, as they undoubtedly will under the
current Administration. Third, states may have access to additional
enforcement tools not available to the U.S. DOL. The following are reforms
that could be the focus of advocacy campaigns at the state level, where
most energy for reform is likely to be in the next several years.
A.

TargetedEnforcement

Most wage and hour enforcement occurs through complaints filed by
workers. Yet, workers who are the most likely to suffer from wage theft
are the least likely to come forward to report a violation because they lack
information about their rights, access to legal advice and counsel, time and
resources to pursue a complaint, and the economic security necessary to
risking complaining. 158 This disconnect leads to resource misallocation
and gaps in enforcement.
Limited resources would be better spent on targeted enforcement that
focuses on industries where violations are likely to be the highest, and on
workers who are more likely to experience wage theft. This shift in
enforcement has already begun to occur at the federal level. Under Weil,
the U.S. DOL sought to increase targeted enforcement. 15 9 By the end of
2016, fifty percent of the WHD's enforcement recourses were directed
towards targeted rather than complain-driven enforcement. 16 0 A few
states have made similar decisions, including New York, where an
61
investigative report into pervasive wage theft in the nail salon industryl
led to the creation of an Exploited Worker Task Force. 1 6 2 Subsequent
targeted enforcement actions in New York resulted in 143 nail salons

158. See supra,Section II.
159. See Secretary of Labor Thomas Perez, US Department of Labor Strategic
Plan: 2014-2018, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/
files/StrategicPlan2014-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/HYU6-7FFE].
160. See Semuels, supranote 148 (interview with David Weil).
161. See Sarah Maslin Nir, The Price of Nice Nails, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/nyregion/at-nail-salons-in-nyc[https://perma.cc/8BPImanicurists-are-underpaid-and-unprotected.html
FCVL].
162. See Governor Cuomo Announces Statewide Task Force to Combat Worker
ExploitationandAbuse ThroughoutNew York State, N.Y. ST. (uly 16, 2015),
https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-announcesstatewide-task-force-combat-worker-exploitation-and-abuse-throughout
[https://perma.cc/DK8F-WHKD].
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being order to pay $2 million in unpaid wages and damages. 1 63 A similar
targeted enforcement action in Connecticut found that ninety-two percent
of nail salons had committed wage violations. 1 6 4 Still, most enforcement at
the state level occurs through the investigation of complaints, even in
states that have embraced targeted enforcement such as New York and
Connecticut.
An employer who fears being caught committing wage theft in a
complaint-driven system has an incentive to decrease the likelihood that
their workers will file a complaint by hiring vulnerable workers, such as
non-English speaking immigrants, who are less likely to complain,
discouraging workers from complaining through threats of retaliation, or
failing to provide workers with information about their labor rights as
required by law. In a targeted enforcement system, none of these
strategies works because whether or not a worker complains has no effect
on whether the employer is discovered. The easiest way to target
enforcement is to focus on industries where violations are the highest,
such as the industries identified by the New York Exploited Worker Task
Force: nail salons, farming, childcare, cleaning, home health care, laundry,
restaurants, retail, construction, landscaping, car washes, supermarkets,
janitorial services, truck and waste disposal. 6 s Even within this list, some
industries have higher rates of wage theft than others. For example,
targeted enforcement focused on the restaurants, farms, and nail salons
would likely net a high percentage of legal violations. 166
There may also be a role for the use of data tools in choosing which
employers to target for enforcement actions. The U.S. DOL has eighty years

163. See Chris Fuchs, New York NailSalons Orderedto Pay$2 Million in Unpaid
Wages, Damages, NBC NEWS (May 11, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/
news/asian-america/new-york-nail-salons-ordered-pay-2-million-unpaidwages-n572021 [https://perma.cc/H9Q8-RJN9].
164. See Mark Pazniokas, NailSalonsAre Ubiquitous,andSo Are Labor Violations,
CT MIRROR (Aug. 17, 2015), https://ctmirror.org/2015/08/17/nail-salonsare-ubiquitous-and-so-are-labor-violations [https://perma.cc/7853-GUYR].
165. See JointTaskForceon Worker ExploitationandEmployee Misclassification:
About the Task Force, N.Y. ST., https://www.ny.gov/end-workerexploitation/task-force-combat-worker-exploitation
[https://perma.cc/9CVA-5LG2].
166. For example, a targeted sweep of restaurants by the U.S. Department of
Labor found 84% of targeted restaurants were committing at least one wage
and hour violation. See Sylvia A. Allegretto, Waitingfor Change:Is It Time to
Increase the $2.13 Subminimum Wage? 1, 5 n.2, INST. RES. ON LAB. EMP.
(2013),
http://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2013/Waiting-for-Change.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7HYM-8JAF].
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of enforcement data about which employers have been found to violate the
law. This data could be useful for identifying patterns of wage theft and
characteristics of wage theft violators. In addition to industry, algorithmic
analysis could take into account worker characteristics, geography and
neighborhood, sub-industry, pricing, tax records, and products to identify
employers who are likely to be violating wage and hour laws and who
could be subjected to targeted enforcement. In some industries, such
advanced targeting techniques may not even be necessary. As long as wage
theft rates remain high, almost any targeted employer is likely to be
violating the law. It is much easier to find a needle in a haystack when the
haystack is made of needles.16 7
Targeted enforcement can also include use of routinized records
inspections to identify potential noncomplying employers. Employers are
required to keep payroll records under federal and many state laws and
168
Many
records violations can result in civil penalties and fines.
would
noncomplying employers do not, precisely because such records
reveal legal violations. 1 6 9 Records inspections would require fewer
resources per employer than full-scale wage and hour investigations,
which also usually include extensive worker interviews and other
investigatory techniques.17 0 If an employer is found to lack payroll records
during a records inspection or there were indicia of fraud found in the
records themselves, then the employer could be fined and a full
investigation could be opened. Importantly, if such records inspections
were conducted randomly, then employers could not take any steps to
avoid an inspection and possible discovery. Even if records inspections
were not used to identify non-complying employers, merely enforcing the
records keeping requirements would increase employer compliance by

167. A common joke in workers' rights circles goes like this: which restaurant is
more likely to be violating the law-the restaurant sued last year for wage
theft, or the restaurant next door that has never been sued. The answer is
the restaurant next door. The restaurant who was sued actually may now be
complying with the law, whereas it's probably business as usual at the
restaurant next door.
168. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 516 (2018) (recordkeeping requirements under the
FLSA); FactSheet #21: RecordkeepingRequirements Under the FairLabor
Standards

Act,

U.S.

DEP'T

LABOR,

https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/

compliance/whdfs21.htm [https://perma.cc/9TPM-EQMZ].
169. See Bernhardt et al., supra note 58 at 827 (finding that employers who pay
in cash or do not use time clocks more likely to be wage and hour violators).
170. See, e.g., FactSheet #44: Visits to Employers, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, WAGE AND HOUR
https://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/whdfs44.htm
DIVISION,
[https://perma.cc/X8K3-R8R8] (explaining DOL investigation process).
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making it more difficult for non-complying employers to commit
violations.17 1
Finally, targeted enforcement should focus on "repeat offenders," who
continue to violate the law even after being discovered. Typically, once the
U.S. DOL or the state labor agencies close an investigation, no follow up
investigation occurs unless a worker files another complaint. A targeted
enforcement program could make these employers a priority and keep
investigations open by conducting periodic inspections of these
employers. If this were the norm, one worker complaint would lead to
years of increased scrutiny of the employer's labor practices, further
deterring violations.
B.

Improved ComplaintProcess

It may not be wise to move away from a complaint system altogether.
A worker who is owed wages and who cannot find private counsel should
not have to wait for a targeted enforcement action to recoup them.
Moreover, the complaint process, while imperfect, has the benefit of
identifying employers who are more likely to be violating the law, and can
lead to targeted enforcement that focuses on employers who have already
been caught, as discussed above. But it should be possible to improve the
complaint system so that it does a better job of deterring employer
behavior.
First, states could take steps to encourage the most vulnerable
workers to come forward to make complaints when their employer fails to
pay them what they are owed. One way to accomplish this goal is through
public education, because a worker who does not know his rights cannot
file a complaint. States already recognize how important it is that workers

171. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) uses this same tactic to enforce
the prohibition against hiring undocumented workers. Employers are
required by law to keep "1-9" forms for each employee that confirm
employees have valid work authorization. ICE routinely conducts "1-9"
inspections of this paperwork and non-complying employers are fined. ICE
conducts these records inspections in addition to more traditional
enforcement actions that may lead to more serious civil or criminal
penalties. See Form 1-9 Inspection Overview, U.D. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/i9-inspection [https://perma.
cc/K4SY-WQRU];
Andorra
Bruno,
Immigration-Related Worksite
Enforcement: Performance Measures, CONG. RES. SERV. (2015), https://fas.
org/sgp/crs/homesec/R40002.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7XK-LKRX].
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know their rights, as evidenced by the requirement under FLSA and some
state labor laws that employers post a notice about wage and hour laws. 1 7 2
Fundamentally, there are two problems with relying on notice posting
to educate workers about their rights. First, wage and hour law is too
complicated to impart sufficient information in a one-page poster. For
instance, the federal wage and hour poster, after explaining basic
minimum wage and overtime rights, states that "[c]ertain occupations and
establishments are exempt from the minimum wage, and/or overtime pay
73
The notice
provisions" but does not explain what the exemptions are.'
also briefly explains that employees are generally entitled to the minimum
wage and overtime while "independent contractors" are not, but does not
explain what the definition of each is.1 74 It would be next to impossible to
provide enough information for workers to determine whether their rights
are being violated.
Second, notice posting relies on employers, whose incentives lie not in
educating workers, but in keeping them in the dark. Not surprisingly,
employers who are violating the law are the least likely to follow the
posting requirements. The notices are supposed to be posted in
"conspicuous places" so as to allow workers "to observe readily a copy,"17 5
76
but often they are not. The notice is available in other languages,1 but
with a few exceptions, there is no requirement that employers post it in

172. See, e.g., Workplace Posters, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/
Posting
[https://perma.cc/2TRM-FCCG];
whd/resources/posters.htm
Requirements for Oregon Employers, OREGON.Gov, http://www.oregon.gov/
Workplace
boli/ta/pages/req-postaspx [https://perma.cc/NV5W-LHKA];
Postings, CAL. DEP'T INDUS. REL., https://www.dir.ca.gov/wpnodb.html
[https://perma.cc/MZD9-NUEK]; Employment-Related Posters, ALASKA
DIVIsIoN LAB. STANDARDS & SAFETY, http://labor.alaska.gov/lss/posters.htm

[https://perma.cc/GRH6-EARB]; DWD Workplace Posters, Wis. DEP'T
[https://
WORKFORCE DEV., https://dwd.wisconsin.gov/dwd/posters.htm
perma.cc/R5A4-Q9KN].
173. Minimum Wage Poster, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/
[https://perma.cc/A8GNwhd/regs/compliance/posters/minwage.pdf
9YGN].
174. Id.
175. 29 C.F.R § 516.4 (2017).
176. The federal minimum wage poster is available in many different languages,
see https://www.dol.gov/whd/pubs-by-language.htm

[https://perma.cc/

7VQ8-L4FA], but there is no requirement that employers post it in any
language other than English.
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any language except English. 7 Some employers fail to post the notice at
all,178 and with such a small likelihood of a surprise inspection by DOL,
most employers who violate the posting requirements are never caught.
The first problem could be solved by having new employees watch a
video about wage and hour laws, which would allow more information to
be imparted than can be conveyed on a poster. But solving the second
problem requires that we rethink whose responsibility it is to educate
workers about their rights. The state labor agencies have a role to play
here, and state wage theft campaigns could focus on getting these agencies
to embrace this role. Different strategies may work in different places. In
dense urban centers, state agencies could open neighborhood store front
offices where workers could go to get information, ask questions, and file
complaints. In rural areas, agencies may need to employ more online
education through phone apps or chat programs, which could allow
workers to get information through the internet.1 79 In farming
communities with large populations of workers without consistent
internet access, agencies may need to get creative; for instance, there may
be a role for mobile labor vehicles that visit rural farms and dispense
information. 18 0 The information is available now for those workers who
actively seek it out, but most workers will not and may not have the time
or resources to do so. Workers with more information are more likely to
file complaints, and would allow the complaint-based system to uncover
problems across all industries and workers.
Even workers who know their rights will not file complaints if the
benefit of complaining is uncertain and the risk of complaining is high.
Reforms should address both sides of this equation. On the benefit side,
wage theft campaigns should advocate for state labor agencies to set
timelines for investigating wage claims and to mandate that all wage

177. See FrequentlyAsked Questions, U.S. DEP'T LABOR, http://webapps.dol.gov/
dolfaq/go-dol-faq.asp?faqid= 546&faqsub= Office+of+the+Assistant+
Secretary+for+Policy+ (OASP)&faqtop=Agencies+%2 6+Offices
[https://perma.cc/N3MF-URB].
178. I have litigated countless cases against employers where the employer failed
to post the required notice, or posted it in a place where employees could
notreadit
179. The U.S. DOL has a phone app called "Timesheet" which allows workers to
keep records of their pay and hours if their employer does not do it for them.
The U.S. DOL, however, does not have an app that allows workers to
interface with a live person over the internet to get information or file a
complaint
180. For an example of this type of worker education see Nanny Van,
http://www.nannyvan.org [https://perma.cc/BCH4-4C77].
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claims get resolved. These administrative reforms will only work if more
resources are devoted to investigating wage claims. Much of the current
problem with long delays has to do with the small number of investigators
available to handle claims. It is unrealistic to expect the same number of
investigators to resolve claims at a substantially faster rate.
However, there may be ways to make the complaint process more
efficient even with limited resources. For instance, one persistent problem
is that employers stonewall investigations, missing agency-imposed
deadlines for turning over records in wage disputes.' 8 1 Investigators
spend countless hours simply trying to get information from employers,
which delays the resolution of the claims and decreases the number of
complaints that can be handled by each investigator. One way to solve this
problem is to institute a default system not unlike default judgment
available under Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. State
agencies could give employers a certain amount of time to respond-say,
thirty days-and then issue an order in favor of the worker if the employer
fails to respond. Under federal law, if an employer fails to maintain payroll
records, then the worker can prove his claim for unpaid wages through his
testimony alone.182 This rule could also be instituted by state labor
agencies, which would incentivize employers to keep records and also
could allow for faster resolution of wage claims.
On the risk side, state labor agencies could do more to ensure that
workers who file complaints are not retaliated against by employers.
Beyond vigorously enforcing anti-retaliation laws, one way to do this is to
use new technology to allow for truly anonymous complaints. The U.S. DOL
and some state labor agencies currently have policies in place that protect
the identities of workers who complain.' 83 But the agencies still know the
workers' identities. Workers may not trust that the agency will keep the
complaint confidential and they may have reason to worry. The U.S. DOL,
for instance, tells workers up front that they may have to turn over the
identity of complaining witnesses if the dispute ends up in court.1 84 State

181. I have observed this in many wage and hour investigations at both the state
and federal level that I have observed through my representation of
witnesses.
182. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946).
183. See FactSheet #44: Visits to Employers, supranote 170 ("All complaints are
confidential; the name of the worker and the nature of the complaint are not
disclosable; whether a complaint exists may not be disclosed."); WINNING
WAGE JUSTICE, supra note 79 at 58 (noting nine states that keep workers'
identities confidential).
184. See FrequentlyAsked Questions: How to File a Complain4 U.S. DEP'T LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/whd/faq-workers.htm [https://perma.cc/46DA-G72Y
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laws governing confidentiality contain similar caveats. 185 Some
organizations such as Wikileaks and the Intercept have created portals
through which informants can provide information related to government
malfeasance and other sensitive subjects."' These portals allow
individuals to remain anonymous even to the organizations themselves,
thus mitigating the risk that individuals' identities will be revealed. The
U.S. DOL and state labor agencies could create similar portals for worker
complaints.
Immigrant workers are especially at risk of retaliation. Unfortunately,
most measures designed to protect immigrant workers must be
implemented by the federal government, which is exclusively responsible
for immigration enforcement. For instance, only the federal government
can ensure that employers' efforts to retaliate against immigrant workers
are unsuccessful by refusing to follow up on tips related to labor disputes.
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between U.S. DOL and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that has been in place since
at least 1998 prohibits ICE from initiating enforcement actions during
pending DOL investigations.1 88 It also requires ICE to assess "whether tips

] (complaints are not confidential "when the WHD [Wage and Hour Division]
is ordered to reveal information by a court").
185. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23-364(C) (2018) ("The name of any
employee identified in a complaint to the commission shall be kept
confidential as long as possible. Where the commission determines that an
employee's name must be disclosed in order to investigate a complaint
further, it may do so only with the employer's consent").
186. The Intercept uses a system called securedrop, through which individuals
can provide information in a secure, anonymous way. See The Intercept
INTERCEPT,
https://theintercept.com/leak
Welcomes
Whistleblowers,
[https://perma.cc/VF4A-783D]. Wikileaks uses a system called TAILS (The
Amnesic Incognito Live System), which allows users to run a program off a
USB drive to transmit documents and communicate with Wikileaks
anonymously. See TAILS, https://tails.boum.org [https://perma.cc/J6S2A8E3]; Submit documents to Wikileaks, WIKILEAKS, https://wikileaks
.org/index.en.html#submithelptor [https://perma.cc/7C69-NWH9].
187. Some states already allow for anonymous complaints. See WINNING WAGE
JUSTICE, supranote 79, at 58 (identifying six states that allow for anonymous
complaints). However, workers in these states are limited to filing paper
complaints by mail using claim forms which ask for the worker's name.
Workers may not be aware that they can file a complaint anonymously.
Moreover, allowing workers to file such complaints electronically would
increase accessibility to the complaint process.
188. See John Morton & M. Patricia Smith, Revised Memorandum of
Understandingbetween the Departments of Homeland Security and Labor
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and leads it receives concerning worksite enforcement are motivated by
an improper desire to manipulate a pending labor dispute, retaliate
against employees for exercising labor rights, or otherwise frustrate the
enforcement of labor laws."' 8 9 In practice, until very recently, 'ICE rarely
followed up on tips received during the course of a labor dispute.
However, the Trump Administration's commitment to deconfliction of
labor and immigration enforcement appears weak, even though the MOU
remains in effect. In California, ICE agents have attempted to arrest several
workers scheduled to appear for interviews or meetings with the Labor
Commissioner's Office since November 2016.190 Current and former staff
of U.S. DOL have reported that immigrant workers have begun refusing to
cooperate in investigations due to fears that they will be reported to ICE
and deported. 191 This policy shift will almost certainly lead to fewer
workers filing complaints and more labor exploitation.
Another needed reform at the federal level is an expansion of the Uvisa program to explicitly cover employees retaliated against during labor
disputes. Currently, immigrant victims of certain crimes are eligible for
relief from deportation and a path to a green card,19 2 but the list of
qualifying crimes is circumscribed.19 3 The U.S. DOL and some state labor
agencies currently certify immigrant workers for U visas as victims of

189.
190.

191.

192.
193.

132

ConcerningEnforcementActivitiesat Worksites, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY
& U.S. DEP'T LABOR, 2 (2011), https://www.dol.gov/asp/media/reports/DHSDOL-MOU.pdf [https://perma.cc/8D52-GSW5].
Id
See Natalie Kitroeff, Officials Say ImmigrationAgents Showed Up at Labor
Dispute Proceedings. CaliforniaWants Them Ou4 L.A. TIMEs (Aug. 3, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fl-ice-california-labor-20170802story.html [https://perma.cc/8JSE-8JUS].
See Sam Levin, ImmigrationCrackdown Enables Worker Exploitation, Labor
30, 2017), https://www
Department Staff Say GUARDIAN (Mar.
.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/30/undocumented-workersdeportation-fears-trump-administration-department-labor
[https://perma.cc/VB5K-5N78].
8 U.S.C. § 1184(p) (2018).
The statutory list of qualifying crimes is: rape, torture, trafficking, incest,
domestic violence, sexual assault, abusive sexual contact, prostitution, sexual
exploitation, stalking, female genital mutilation, being held hostage, peonage,
involuntary servitude, slave trade, kidnapping, abduction, unlawful criminal
restraint, false imprisonment, blackmail, extortion, manslaughter, murder,
felonious assault, witness tampering, obstruction of justice, perjury, fraud in
foreign labor contracting, or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit
any of the above mentioned crimes. See8 U.S.C. § 1101(U)(iii) (2012).
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certain existing qualifying crimes, such as witness tampering, obstruction
of justice, and extortion.1 9 4 Expanding the list of qualifying crimes to
include retaliation would give federal and state agencies an important tool
to protect workers who have complained of wage theft.
As in the case of the MOU, expanded U-visa protection for workplace
crimes will only protect immigrant workers to the extent that federal
immigration officials share that goal. Obtaining a U visa is a long process
and ICE can legally remove individuals while their U visa applications are
pending. During the Obama Administration, ICE had a policy of not
removing victims of crime who were eligible for U visas.1 95 This policy
appears to have changed. 1 9 6
States can do very little to encourage immigrant workers to come
forward as long as federal immigration policy remains an obstacle.
Advocates should pressure labor agencies in states that do not currently
certify U visas for workplace crimes to do so and to fully enforce antiretaliation laws against employers who retaliate by calling immigration on
their workers. But if the federal government wishes to deport immigrant
workers while their U visa applications are pending, there is very little that
states can do. This means that, ultimately, states must rely on tools other
than complaints to deter employers from violating the law, particularly

194. See IDOL Policy Memorandum: ObtainingU- Visas in InvestigatedCases, ILL.
DEP'T OF LABOR, https://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/il-dolprotocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/RT65-7L2B]; Memorandum & Order
Regarding Certification of U Visa Petitions, U Visa Protocol, N.Y. ST. DEP'T
LABOR, https://www.nationalimmigrationprojectorg/PDFs/ny-dol- protocol.
uvisa.pdf [https://perma.cc/G576-LBAB]; U and T Visa Certifications, U.S.
DEP'T LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/whd/immigration/UTCert.htm [https://
perma.cc/HNB4-VMF7]; U and T Visa Certifications, CAL. DEP'T FAIR EMP.
HOUSING,
https://www.dfeh.ca.gov/u-and-t-visa-certifications
[https://
perma.cc/3JGV-CV4A].
195. See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Guidance Regarding U
Nonimmigrant Status (U visa) Applicants in Removal Proceedings or with
Final Orders of Deportation or Removal
(Sept
25, 2009),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro-policy-memos/vincent-memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X4YZ-ML4D];
U.S.
Immigration
and
Customs
Enforcement Guidance: Adjudicating Stay Requests Filed by U
Nonimmigrant Status (U-visa) Applicants, Sept 24, 2009, available at
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro-policy-memos/11005-1-hd-stay
requests-filed by-u-visa-applicants.pdf [https://perma.cc/59NB-MDDR].
196. Nora Caplan-Bricker, "I Wish Id Never Called the Pollcd', SLATE (Mar. 9,
2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/cover-story/2017
/03/u-visas-gave-a-safe-path-to-citizenship-to victimsofabuse_under_
trump.html [https://perma.cc/87GY-K9LR].
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9
Long term, only
employers who employ many immigrant workers.
immigration reform that addresses the status of the millions of
undocumented immigrants living and working in the United States will
allow the wage crisis to be solved.

C.

UtilizationofAll Enforcement Tools

Enforcement tools on the books are meaningless if enforcement
agencies do not utilize them. In states with steep civil fines, for example,
employers often get away with paying far less than the maximum amount
for which they are liable under the law. Some states have experimented
with making liquidated damages mandatory to ensure that penalties are
actually imposed. 198 Expanded use of these mandatory damages provisions
would decrease the possibility of employers paying no penalty beyond the
wages owed.
But given that traditional monetary penalties have proven ineffective
at deterring employer misconduct, it is important that states
simultaneously explore alternate enforcement strategies. States must
challenge employers' assumption that they can violate the law and at
worst pay a fine. Instead, they must utilize tools that disrupt the use of
wage theft as a business model.
For instance, states could enact "hot goods" provisions similar to the
one that currently exists in FLSA, which permits a court to enjoin the
99
transportation or sale of goods produced using unlawful labor practices.
The U.S. DOL has rarely used its power to enjoin the sale or transportation
of "hot goods," despite the fact that it is a potent tool to force compliance
with wage and hour laws. 2 0 0 The U.S. DOL under Obama attempted to
resurrect it, but ran into fierce opposition from employers.2 01 In 2015, two

197. Undocumented workers are the most vulnerable to retaliation by employers.
In the current political climate, however, even legal immigrants may fear
that a call to ICE will result in negative consequences, particularly if the
worker has undocumented family members.
198. See, e.g., 2010 Wash. Legis. Serv. Ch. 42 (West 2018).
199. 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2018); see Karen L. Able, Note, "Hot Goods" Liability
Secured Creditorsand the FairLabor StandardsAct 87 COLuM. L. REV. 644,
644-47 (1987).
200. See Stephanie A. Koltookian, Some (Don't) Like It Hot: The Use of the "Hot
Goods" Injunction in PerishableAgriculture, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1841, 1844
(2015).
201. See Gabriel Thompson, Good Crop, Bad Crop, SLATE (Aug. 2, 2016),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/the-grind/2016/08/the-hot-good
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blueberry growers successfully sued the Department of Labor, arguing
that the "hot goods" provision was economically coercive when used to
force a settlement in cases involving perishable produce.20 2 The case was
not a general challenge to the "hot goods" provision, however, and it
remains one of the strongest tools that U.S. DOL currently has to force
employer compliance. 2 0 3 States-if they could overcome the immense
opposition that would surely arise-could enact "hot goods" provisions of
their own.
States could also utilize existing tools to raise the stakes for employers
who commit the most egregious violations of the wage and hour laws.
Most obviously, state law enforcement agencies could begin enforcing
criminal wage theft laws. Since local police departments are often resistant
to enforcing laws against wage theft to the same extent they enforce laws
against other types of theft, states might need to create task forces to do
this work. However, reliance on criminal enforcement also has
disadvantages. There is the risk that criminal law enforcement against
employers will ensnare workers as well. But the possibility of criminal
penalties, including imprisonment, will send the message to employers
that they cannot violate the law and get off with a slap on the wrist.2 0 4
Likewise, state labor agencies could use the ability to enjoin employers
from violating wage and hour laws-and the corresponding recourse to
contempt proceedings if the injunction is violated-to raise the personal
risk an employer takes when violating the law. FLSA 2 0 5 and sixteen states'
wage and hour lawS 2 0 6 allow courts to issue injunctions. FLSA permits the

202.

203.
204.

205.
206.

s-provision allowsthe_1abor-department to_stop-wage.theftithtml
[https://perma.cc/6AVX-6W9X].
See Perez v. Pan-Am. Berry Growers, LLC, No. 6:12-CV-1439-TC, 2014 WL
198781 (D. Or. Jan. 15, 2014), reportand recommendation adopted, No.
6:12-CV-1439-TC, 2014 WL 1668254 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2014).
SeeKoltookian, supranote 200.
Criminal penalties would not need to be severe to have the intended effect.
Research suggests that it is the fact of criminal liability, not the extent of that
liability, that deters illegal conduct. See Robinson &Darley, supranote 139.
29 U.S.C. §§ 211, 217 (2018).
ALASKA STAT. § 23.05.115 (2018); ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-4-206(i) (2018); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 31-2(d) (2018); FLA. STAT. § 448.110(6)(c)(2) (2018); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 387-12(d)(1) (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-1508(1) (West

2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 150 (2018); MINN. STAT. § 181.171, subd. 1
(2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-26(F) (2018); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-25.24
(2018); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.125 (2018); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-19-2(a); TEX.
LAB. CODE ANN. § 61.082 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-40-205 (2018); WASH.
REV. CODE § 49.48.060(2-3) (2018); W. VA. CODE § 21-SC-6(e) (2018).
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U.S. DOL, but not private parties, to seek an injunction to restrain
violations of minimum wage and overtime laws.207 States vary in whether
private parties can seek injunctive relief or whether state labor agencies
must bring such actions. 2 0 8 But these provisions are rarely used at either
the federal or state level. 2 0 9 The threat of being held in contempt provides
a much stronger deterrent than the possibility that the labor agency will
file a new case somewhere down the road. It would at least ensure that
employers who are caught committing wage theft do not become repeat
offenders.
D. Recovery-FirstEnforcement
One of the problems with the current enforcement regime is that
workers cannot be assured that they will recover their wages if they file a
complaint. Thus, we should think about reordering the recovery process. A
recovery-first enforcement regime would pay back wages to workers after
an investigation by the relevant agency, which would then seek recovery
from the employer in an enforcement action. The system could operate
like the tax enforcement system does today. Employers would get a bill
after an investigation that would require them to pay back wages,
penalties, civil fines, and interest on wages already paid out to workers.
Employers could then challenge the determination in court at their own
expense. Because the money would be owed to the government, not an
individual worker, the government could use all legal tools within its
disposal to effectuate recovery, including liens, garnishment, and seizure
of property and assets. A worker would file a "claim," not a "complaint,"
and would be assured that if the Department of Labor found the claim
valid, it would result in real money in their pockets. The government
would take the risk that the employer will be found insolvent or will
disappear.
A few states and cities have already begun to experiment with a very
limited form of recovery-first enforcement called wage pools, which collect
revenues from employers and pool them to provide a fund of last resort for

207. Jordan Laris Cohen has argued that federal law should be changed to allow
private parties to use the FLSA injunction that is currently only available to
U.S. DOL. See Jordan Laris Cohen, Democratizing the FLSA Injunction:
Toward a Systemic Remedy for Wage Thefr 127 YALE L.J. 706, 708-20
(2018).
208. Id. at 710-12.
209. A search of FLSA cases between 2013-2017 identified seventeen cases in
which the U.S. DOL sought an injunction under 29 U.S.C. § 217.
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workers who are owed wages and are unable to collect them from their
employers. Wage pools currently exist in Maine, Oregon, Ohio, California
(for certain industries,) and the District of Columbia.2 10 Some of these
wage pools are limited with respect to how much money a worker can
recover or which employers are covered. For instance, Maine's Wage
Assurance Fund guarantees the final two weeks of wages owed by any
employer who has terminated his or her business and/or declared
bankruptcy.21 1 In Ohio, the wage pool is only available for violations of the
state's prevailing wage statute, not for minimum wage violations.2 1 2 The
District of Columbia's Wage Theft Prevention Fund is probably the
broadest wage pool in the country because it contains no statutory
limitations on who can recover or how much they can recover and states
broadly that it "shall be used to enforce the provisions of this chapter, the
Minimum Wage Revision Act, the Sick and Safe Leave Act, and the Living
Wage Act." 2 1 3
Wage pools acknowledge that many workers will never be able to
recover money they are owed directly from their employers. But even the
broadest wage pools only pay out money to workers after they have
exhausted all other avenues of recovery. To access wage pools, workers
must still file a complaint, work through the complaint process, and obtain
a wage judgment. Only if they are unable to collect on that judgment can
they rely on the wage pool. This means that wage pools suffer from many
of the same problems that afflict the traditional wage complaint process:
most workers don't complain and those that do rarely make it all the way
to obtaining a judgment, either because they are convinced to settle for
pennies on the dollar or they drop the complaint altogether. Moreover,
most wage pools would collapse if more than a fraction of workers owed
money filed claims because their funding structure is not robust. Most are
paid for by licensing fees or civil fines, 214 neither of which can sustain the
billions of dollars a year that are owed to low-wage workers across the
country.
A recovery-first enforcement regime would require more government
resources than are available to wage pools to be successful. The
government would need to operate under the assumption that it would be
210. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 26, § 632 (2018); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4115.101
(West 2018); OR. REV STAT. § 657.439 (2018); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2675.5 (West
2018); D.C. CODE § 32-1307.01 (2018).
211. SeeME.

REV. STAT. ANN. tit.

26, § 632(1) (2018).

212. SeeOHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4115.101 (West 2018).
213. D.C. CODE § 32-1307.01 (2018).
214. Id
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unable to recoup all of the wages paid out to workers. The government
could finance recovery-first enforcement through increased civil fines,
taxes, or some combination of both. Moreover, for such a system to be an
effective deterrent, the government would still need to invest resources in
effectuating recovery from employers; otherwise, employers would have
little incentive to comply with the law, and the enforcement regime would
turn into a wage supplementation program, in which the government
would merely be subsidizing unscrupulous employers who break the law.
Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether the government is better
suited than workers to take on the risk associated with recovering wages
from recalcitrant employers.
E.

Diffuse Enforcement

This Article has for the most part focused on enforcement by
governmental agencies, but the scope of the problem requires that we also
look to other actors to play a role in the enforcement of wage and hour
laws. Centralized enforcement must be complemented by diffuse
enforcement that keeps employers accountable even when they have not
come to the attention of governmental authorities.
The private bar participates in diffuse enforcement by litigating wage
and hour claims under the private right of action available under FLSA and
state labor statutes, 215 but it fails to fill the gaps left by lax government
enforcement for several reasons. First, as discussed above, there are
simply not enough private attorneys who take wage and hour cases to
solve the enforcement problem. 216 Moreover, the type of cases that the
private bar takes are likely to leave the most vulnerable workers without
legal representation, because lower value cases are less attractive to
attorneys working on contingency. There may be reforms that would
help-for instance, increasing liquidated damages makes cases with small
damages amounts more profitable. A qui tam action would allow the
private bar to collect civil fines and might encourage more civil suits. 2 1 7

215. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2018).
216. See supraSection II.
217. A qui tam action, which allows a private party to sue to recover damages
owed to the government, is a well-established mechanism for increasing the
incentive for private parties to engage in socially-desirable litigation. See
David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General
Evidencefrom Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1244, 1253 (2012).

Qui

tam actions under the False Claims Action have been used quite effectively to
deter fraud against the government. Id.
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But other actors can contribute to diffuse enforcement. Labor unions
traditionally played this role. 2 1 8 Workers in unionized workplaces had
clear avenues for lodging complaints about wages and had protection from
retaliation if they complained. 219 Today, most industries with high rates of
wage theft have union density rates that approach zero. 220 Stepping in are
worker centers and other non-traditional labor organizations who, in
addition to being the driving force behind many wage theft laws, also play
the watchdog in many low-wage industries with low union density.2 21
However, worker centers are not evenly distributed across the country. In
places like New York and Los Angeles, 22 2 there are numerous worker
centers providing these services. In smaller cities or rural areas, they
either do not exist or exist in embryonic form.223 Encouraging the growth
of the worker center movement is one way to indirectly address the wage
theft crisis. Similarly, policies that foster labor unions are likely to have a
positive effect on the prevalence of wage theft.
Another possibility is to require employers in industries with high
wage theft rates to purchase "wage insurance," which would both ensure
that workers can recover their wages if they complain and also give
private insurance companies the role of monitoring employers' wage
practices. Employers are already required to purchase workers'
compensation insurance and often obtain liability insurance for negligence
claims. In the case of workers' compensation insurance, the insurance
218. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of SelfRegulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 326 (2005) (discussing the shift of
workplace regulation from labor unions to administrative agencies).
219. Most collective bargaining agreements set up grievance procedures that
union members can utilize if they have a complaint against their employer.
See Sean C. Doyle, The Grievance Procedure: The Heartof the Collective
Agreement, INDUs. REL. CENT. (1999), https://irc.queensu.ca/sites/
default/files/articles/the-grievance-procedure-the-heart-of-collcetiveagreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BRD-TP6U].
220. For example, in 2017, the food service industry had a unionization rate of
1.4%. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., Union Members-2017 (Jan. 19, 2018),
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nrO.htm
[https://perma.cc/2ZSX-86GP].
221. See FINE, supranote 10 1.
222. See Janice Fine, Tam Doan & Jon Werberg, Worker Centers: CommunityBased and Led Worker Organizing Projects, NAT'L STUDY ON IMMIGRANT
CTRS.
(2005), http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/resources/
WORKER
titles/80140100932140/extras/MapWorker-Centers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HN66-N3YC].
2 2 3. Id.
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company often does a safety inspection to identify any issues that may give
rise to future claims.22 4 Such inspections are not normally legally required,
but certainly could be, and would identify potential legal violations before
a worker complains.22 s
The incentive to obtain the lowest possible rates on wage insurance
could create a deterrent effect that sporadic governmental enforcement
could never achieve. If employers knew that their insurance rates would
go up if they had a wage claim filed against them, it would encourage them
to ensure their wage practices were compliant. Repeat violators, unable to
procure private insurance, would be pushed out of business or would face
additional penalties for failure to maintain insurance.22 6
A wage insurance system would work synergistically with the existing
enforcement regime. Enforcement by either government agencies or
private parties would still be necessary to prompt compliance; insurance
companies would need to believe that there was a realistic probability that
their clients would be subject to a wage action in order to be incentivized
to police their clients. However, a wage insurance system would amplify
the government resources spent on enforcement by enlisting private
parties. Such a system would also make recovery easier because workers
and agencies would be seeking recovery from centralized insurance
companies rather than individual businesses.
Though no jurisdiction currently requires wage insurance, some do
require employers to purchase a wage "bond" as insurance against future
wage claims. Wage bonds are most common in the construction
224. John Dwight Ingram, Liability of Insurers for Neghgence in Inspection of
InsuredPremises, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 623, 624 (2002).
225. The workers' compensation regime is not without its problems. The lack of a
private cause of action and the limitations on damages for workplace
injuries has arguably made workers less safe by failing to adequately deter
employer misconduct. See Emily A. Spieler, PerpetuatingRisk? Workers'
Compensationand the Persistenceof OccupationalInjuries, 31 Hous. L. REV.
119, 119-29 (1994) (discussing the failures of the worker compensation
regime to lower rates of workplace injuries).
226. In every insurance market, there are "uninsurable" individuals or companies
that are unable to purchase insurance on the open market without
regulatory controls. For example, prior to the enactment of the Affordable
Care Act, approximately 16% of Americans were unable to purchase health
insurance on the private market. See Gary Claxton et al., Pre-existing
Conditions and Medical Underwritingin the Individual Insurance Market
Prior to the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 2016), https://www.kff.
org/health-reform/issue-brief/pre-existing-conditions-and-medical-under
writing-in-the-individual-insurance-market-prior-to-the-aca [https://perma.
cc/HZ5S-DP97].
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industry 227 and agricultural sector, 228 but have begun to spread to other
industries as well. For instance, in New York, nail salons are required to
procure a wage bond of between $25,000 and $125,000 depending on the
number of employees. 229 Wage insurance, in the form of bonds or a more
traditional insurance policy, could be expanded to all low-wage industries
or even to all employers below a certain size. Importantly, wage insurance
could be designed and implemented by state and local jurisdictions, which
would allow the program to be narrowly tailored to respond to local
patterns of wage theft.
The more eyes there are on employers, the less likely employers will
be able to commit wage theft with impunity. Given the scope of the
problem, no single actor can do it. The private bar, labor unions, worker
centers, and insurance companies all have a role to play in deterring wage
theft.
V.

SOCIAL NORMS AGAINST WAGE THEFT

Many employers are clearly acting in their economic self-interest
when they commit wage theft. The risk that they will get caught and have
to pay a penalty is low, and the profit they stand to gain is substantial. Yet
it is also true that most employers do not commit wage theft, despite the
clear economic benefit of doing so. Why? In short, because some
employers are obeying extrinsic or internalized social norms.
People obey the law for all sorts of reasons, only some of which relate
to avoiding detection and legal consequences. 230 In particular, social norms
encourage compliance with the law even when it is otherwise adverse to
one's self-interest.23 ' In many cases, social norms are more effective at

227. See, e.g, Ky. REV. STAT. § 337.200 (West 2018); MICH. CON. LAWS ANN. §

129.203 (2018).
228. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1684(a)(3) (West 2018); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 48-

1705 (West 2018).
229. See New York State Nail Salon Industry Enforcement Task Force, Nail Salon
Wage Bond Coverage FAQs, N.Y. DEP'T ST., https://www.dos.ny.gov/
licensing/appearance/Wage%20Bond%20FAQs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EEX2-XFVM].
230. See ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 3-4 (1990) (identifying both

"instrumental" and "normative" reasons that people obey the law).
231. See DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAw 106-107 (1976); Dan M. Kahan,

SocialInfluence, Social Meaning and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 354-55
(1997). Social norms act like an alternative form of social control that affect
behavior through indirect means. See also Lawrence Lessig, The New
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regulating behavior 23 2 and more resource efficient than traditional
deterrence. Indeed, most enforcement regimes would be prohibitively
expensive without reliance on norms of voluntary compliance. 23 3 Changing
social norms is difficult, but it can happen quite quickly under the right
circumstances, as evidenced by the successes of other social movements in
23 5
recent years, such as the fight for gay rights, 2 3 4 marijuana legalization,
23 6
and #metoo.
Social norms work to change employer behavior in several ways. First,
violating well-established social norms may harm employers' economic or
reputational interests. 23 7 Consumers may decide to take their business
elsewhere. Publicly traded companies may see their stock price fall.
Business owners may also experience a social cost to being a normviolator. 2 38 Second, as Mitt Romney once said, "corporations are people,

Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998) (identifying law, market
forces, and social norms as alternative models of social control).
232. See Tracey Meares, It'sa Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 579, 594
(1997).
233. See TYLER, supranote 230, at 4 ("If police officers and judges need to compel
the public to obey by threatening or using force, they are required to expend
enormous amounts of resources.").
234. See

Jo

BECKER, FORCING THE SPRING: INSIDE THE FIGHT FOR MARRIAGE EQUALITY

(2014).
235. See US Public Opinion on Legalizing Marijuana, 1969-2017 PEW RES. CTR.
5, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/05/
(Jan.
americans-support-marijuana-legalization/ft_18-01-05-marijuana_1ine
update [https://perma.cc/2QVY-GW8F] (citing a study showing that
support for marijuana legalization has gone from 16% in 1990 to 61%
today).
236. See Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, ATLANTIC (Oct 16, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/themovement-of-metoo/542979 [https://perma.cc/TF5B-22RT] (describing
the rapid rise and spread of the #metoo movement).
237. See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338, 340 (1997).

238. For an example of how social shaming could work in this context, see Alan
Dershowitz, a professor emeritus at Harvard Law School, who has
vehemently defended President Trump and who has complained that his
former friends on Martha's Vineyard have shunned him for violating norms
of acceptable behavior. See Niraj Choksi, Alan Dershowitz Says Martha's
Vineyard Is 'Shunning' Him Over Trump, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/03/us/alan-dershowitz-marthasvineyard.html [https://perma.cc/W6QA-VGXT].
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my friend." 2 3 9 Employers are often corporate entities, but they are still
comprised of individual people making individual decisions about whether
to follow wage and hour laws. Employers make those decisions in part
based on the social norms they have internalized.24 0
The data on wage theft suggests that social norms play an important
role in minimum wage compliance. For instance, Daniel Galvin has
demonstrated that minimum wage compliance is higher in states that are
more ideologically liberal or identify more strongly with the Democratic
Party and posits that these states' political orientations leads to a "culture
of compliance." 2 4 1 Similarly, research suggests that employers with high
brand visibility are less likely to engage in wage theft because they fear
reputational harms, an outward manifestation of social norms. 24 2 By
contrast, the employer who bragged committing that wage theft was "the
way business works in America" was expressing the opposite norm-that
wage theft is normal and morally acceptable.
Those wanting to change social norms around wage theft should look
to strategies used by other social movements with great success. 24 3 These
strategies can be broadly placed into three categories: reframing, naming,
and shaming.

239. Phillip Rucker, Mitt Romney Says CorporationsAre People, WASH. POST (Aug.
11, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mitt-romney-sayscorporations-are-people/2011/08/11/gIQABwZ381_story.html
[https://perma.cc/6NYJ-SA4V].
240. See TYLER, supra note 230 (arguing that people obey the law because they
believe that the law is just); McAdams, supranote 237, at 339.
241. Galvin, supranote 104, at 333.
242. See David Weil, Examining the Underpinnings of Labor Standards
Compliance in Low Wage Industries, RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. (2012),
http://www.russellsage.org/sites/all/files/Weil.Final%2 0Report%2 02012.

pdf [https://perma.cc/7WLP-XR68]. Working for a large corporation does
not fully insulate low-wage workers from wage theft. For example, Wal-Mart
recently paid $4.83 million to 4,500 workers as part of a U.S. DOL settlement
for failure to pay overtime. See Press Release, US Department of Labor
Recovers $4.83 Million in Back Wages, Damagesfor more than 4,500 WalMart Workers, U.S. DEP'T LABOR (May 1, 2012), https://www.dol.gov/
newsroom/releases/whd/whd20120501 [https://perma.cc/J882-PF4X].
243. Cass Sunstein has written about so-called "norm entrepreneurs," who
identify social norms standing in the way of social change and work to
change them. Cass R. Sunstein, On the ExpressiveFunction ofLaw; 144 U. PA.
L. REV. 2021, 2030 (1996).
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Reframing the Issue

The language we use to discuss a problem is an important part of how
social norms develop. We have seen this most recently with the movement
to address sexual harassment and assault in the workplace, known as the
#metoo movement.2 44 One of the lasting victories of the movement may be
the push to reclassify a large body of male behavior, previously considered
"normal," as aberrant or criminal, largely by changing the words we use to
describe it. #Metoo activists consistently use words previously reserved
for more extreme behavior, such as assault, harassment, hostile work
environment, and abuse of power. Opponents in turn have tried to use
words with a different moral valence, such as "flirting," "eros," and "sexual
banter." 2 4 5 This war of words is meaningful because social norms are
influenced by the normative value of language.
Worker centers and labor advocates have used a similar strategy. The
campaign to reframe minimum wage non-compliance as "wage theft,"
discussed earlier in this Article, is an attempt to give moral valence to the
practice by associating it with a concept-theft-with clear normative
implications. The actual practice of failing to pay workers legal wages has
remained the same, but the language used to describe that practice signals
its social significance. An employer is perhaps less likely to cheat workers
if he thinks of it as stealing as opposed to thinking about it as a regulatory
violation. A customer is perhaps more likely to avoid a restaurant that is
committing "wage theft" rather than committing a minimum wage
violation. A worker is more likely to file a complaint or march in the streets
if he or she feels like a victim of a crime, rather than of an accounting error.
The way that the justice system classifies particular conduct can
provide a similar signaling role. Criminalizing conduct, even if penalties
remain low, can give rise to stronger social deterrence because of the
expressive function of declaring something a criminal act.2 4 6 Social
movements have often relied on the criminalization or decriminalization
of conduct to advance social causes. For example, advocates for gender
equality have pushed for affirmative consent laws in part on the theory
244. See Me Too, ME Too MOVEMENT, https://metoomvmt.org [https://perma.cc/
M29S-9YTW].
245. Daphne Merkin, Publicly, We Say #MeToo. Privately, We Have Misgivings,
N.Y. TIMES (an. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/05/opinion/
golden-globes-metoo.html [https://perma.cc/9VVD-JTLF].
246. See e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Meaningand the EconomicAnalysis of Crime,
27 J. LEGAL STUD. 609, 615 (1998); McAdams, supra note 237, at 398;
Robinson & Darley, supra note 139, at 475-76; Cass R. Sunstein, Social
Norms andSocialRoles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 964 (1996).
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that they will change social norms about sexual assault. 2 4 7 This principle
works in reverse as well. For instance, LGBT advocates worked for years to
overturn laws that criminalized homosexual conduct on the theory that
these laws contributed to social stigma. 4
Criminalization or
decriminalization can have clear and swift effects on public opinion. 2 49 Just
look at the public's perception of marijuana legalization in the few years
since the first states laws legalized its sale and use.2 50 Of course, these
examples suffer from a kind of chicken-and-egg problem: which came first,
the laws or the social norms? Social norms must be in the process of
changing for legislators to even consider changing the law. But legal
changes clearly accelerate social changes and vice versa. 2 51
Governments trying to address the wage theft crisis can use this same
strategy. For instance, making wage theft a criminal offense would not
change the economic calculus because criminal wage theft laws are
essentially unenforced. But classifying wage theft as a crime may itself
change the way the public and employers think about it. 2 5 2 Likewise,
passing a law that revokes business licenses for wage theft violators sends
a signal that wage theft is a serious offense. That perception, more than the
number of business licenses that actually get revoked, may drive increased
compliance. Other reforms, such as moving from double to treble damages,
are unlikely to have the same signaling effect because the difference is one
of degree not kind. Because of the difficulty of changing the economic
calculus in a meaningful way, policy reforms may be more successful as
norm-setting devices.
B.

Spotlightingthe Problem

Like many social ills, wage theft has flourished in part because it has
existed in the darkness. Shedding light and naming the problem can
quickly change social norms around a practice. A clear example of this
247. SeeAya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38

CARDOZO L. REV. 415,444

(2016).

248. See Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The Injuries Inflicted by
"Unenforced"SodomyLaws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 103, 104 (2000).
249. See McAdams, supranote 237, at 405.
250. Support for marijuana legalization has gone from 31% in 2000 to 61% in
2018. See Abigail Geiger, About Six-In-Ten Americans Support Marijuana
Legalization, PEw RES. CTR. (Oct. 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2018/01/05/americans-support-marijuana-legalization [https://
perma.cc/6VW6-Y2CY].
251. See McAdams, supranote 237, at 401-03.
252. See Robinson &Darley, supranote 139, at 173.
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strategy in action was the public campaigns about sweatshops in the
253
A
developing world that sprang to light in the 1990s and early 2000s.
practice that many companies once employed with impunity became
radioactive overnight not because the problem changed or worsened, but
because the broader public discovered that it existed. Moreover, research
has shown that anti-sweatshop advocacy resulted in higher wages for
unskilled workers in developing countries. 254
Similarly, worker centers have been successful in raising awareness of
wage theft. Traditional labor unions have gotten into the game as well,
adopting worker center strategies of engaging in industry-wide campaigns
that seek to raise working conditions through advocacy and public
awareness. Campaigns such as the Fight for Fifteen and Healthcare
Workers Rising have flourished with support from the Service Employees
International Union. 2 55 These campaigns have focused much of their
energy on raising the minimum wage, but also have brought public
attention to the issue of wage theft.2 5 6 Unions and worker centers have
begun working together, as evidenced by the partnership between the
7
AFL-CIO and the National Day Laborer Organizing Network.2 5 These
campaigns seek to shed light on industry practices. In this way, campaigns
for local wage theft laws are important because they raise awareness of
the problem of wage theft, even if the policy changes do little to deter
employer conduct on their own.

253. See Steven Greenhouse, Anti-Sweatshop Movement Is Achieving Gains
Overseas, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/01/
26/us/anti-sweatshop-movement-is-achieving-gains-overseas.html
[https://perma.cc/E53R-ZSCD].
254. See e.g., Ann Harrison & Jason Scorse, Multinationalsand Anti-Sweatshop
Activism, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 247, 247-48 (2010).
255. See Steven Greenhouse, How to Get Low-Wage Workers Into the Middle
Class, ATLANTIC (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/
[https://perma
archive/2015/08/fifteen-dollars-minimum-wage/401540
.cc/7CEL-LG8E] (discussing the long-term viability of SEIU's strategy of
underwriting Fight for Fifteen-style campaigns); Kate Andrias, The New
LaborLaw, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 83 (2016).
256. See, eg., Fight for Fifteen, In Fast Food, Wage Theft Runs Rampant,
https://fightforl5.org/unionsforall/2016/11/27/in-fast-food-wage-theftruns-rampant/ [https://perma.cc/755K-64GS].
257. See Jayesh M Rathod, The AFL-CIO-NDLONAgreement: Five Proposalsfor
Advancing the Partnershio(Human Right Brief 14, Paper No. 3, 2007).
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ShamingBadEmployers

Another way to deter wage theft is to use the power of public shaming
against employers who violate the wage and hour laws.2 58 Too often, wage
complaints are resolved quietly and outside of the public eye. Consumers
have no way of knowing whether a particular business commits wage theft
or not. In the age of consumer boycotts, 25 9 where the public often votes
with their pocketbooks against companies' policies, this is a missed
opportunity. Wage judgments against employers should be searchable on
state labor agency websites and the results of large investigations should
be publicized in the press. Employers are more likely to comply with the
law if they fear that not doing so will negatively affect their bottom line
beyond what they may have to pay in unpaid wages and penalties. Worker
centers and other alternative labor organizations have used this strategy
very effectively for many years. 2 6 0 For the most part, state labor agencies
have not. 26 1
Conversely, states could implement programs that reward employers
who do comply with the law. The Restaurant Opportunity Center (ROC)
has pioneered the technique of identifying and trumpeting so-called "high
road" employers. 2 6 2 State labor agencies could expand on this idea by
creating a certification that employers could seek, establishing that they

258. See Emily Chiang, InstitutionalReform Shaming 120 PENN ST. L. REv. 53, 74
(2015); Sunstein, supranote 246, at 941.
259. See Richard Levick, The 'Trump Effect'. Consumer Boycotts Could Become
Pervasive On Both Sides, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/richardlevick/2016/12/05/the-trump-effect-consumer-boycottscould-become-pervasive-on-both-sides [https://perma.cc/FP7Z-M3UF].
260. See Janice Fine, Worker Centers.: OrganizingCommunitiesat the Edge of the
Dream, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417,434 (2006).
261. There have been some high-profile exceptions, particularly after a
settlement has been reached. See, e.g., Press Release, Illinois Att'y Gen. Lisa
Madigan, Madigan: Subcontractor Guilty in Scheme to Cheat Carpenters'
Wages on O'Hare Construction Project, ILL. ATr'Y GEN. (Mar. 19, 2012),
http://illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2012-03/20120319.html
[https://perma.cc/P5MR-PFJE]; Press Release, Massachusetts Att'y Gen.
Martha Coakley, Three Companies to Pay More Than $2.8 Million in
Restitution, Fines and Penalties for Violating the State Wage and Hour Laws,
MASS.GOV

(Mar.

8,

2012),

http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-

updates/press-releases/2012/2012-03-08-prevailing-wage-violations.html
[https://perma.cc/P5V3-TQZ8].
262. See DinersGuide, RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITY CTR.
diners-guide [https://perma.cc/KF9V-Y3NB].
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are complying with the law. In return for such a certification, employers
would open their books to the agencies voluntarily to confirm their
compliance with wage and hour laws.
VI. MINIMUM WAGE POLICY AND WAGE THEFT

At this point, it is clear that there are no easy solutions to solving the
wage theft crisis, which prompts the question: is wage theft an inevitable
consequence of the minimum wage? And perhaps more fundamentally, is
wage theft even a problem we should attempt to solve? If the minimum
wage is bad policy, then one could argue that wage theft is less of a
problem and more of a feature of the current system-strategic law
breaking that lowers wages in industries and locations that cannot support
the minimum wage. Indeed, many scholars have argued that the minimum
wage is not the panacea that progressive advocates believe it is, but
objectively bad for the very people that it is supposed to help-low-wage
workers.2 63
In general, a law-abiding employer has a finite number of options
when faced with a minimum wage set above the market rate for labor:
they can reduce employment or hiring, reduce hours worked, increase
efficiency, raise prices, or reduce profits. 2 6 4 Economists have long sought
to determine which combination of these effects occur after a minimum
wage increase. Early research in the 1970s and 1980s suggested that even
small increases in the minimum wage depressed low-wage job growth 2 65
though most studies focused on teenage employment only.2 6 6 The
conventional wisdom began to shift in the 1990s as new studies found

263. See David Neumark & William Wascher, Minimum Wages and Low-Wage
Workers: How Well Does Reality Match the Rhetoric 92 MINN. L. REV. 1296,
1297 (2008). Critics also argue that the minimum wage distorts the labor
market and leads to inefficiencies and lower rates of economic growth. This
Article will not address these arguments directly because it fundamentally
disagrees with the premise that the goal of labor policy should be wealth
maximization and economic efficiency at the expense of wealth
redistribution.
264. See Sara Lemos, A Survey of the Effects ofthe Minimum Wage on Prices,22
EcoN. SURVEYS 187, 187 (2008).

J.

265. See Neumark & Wascher, supranote 263, at 1309.
266. See Leif Danziger, Noncompliance and the Effects of the Minimum Wage on
Hours and Welfare in Competitive Labor Markets, 16 LAB. EcoN. 625, 625
(2009) ("Note, however, that the studies concerned with the number of
employed workers have almost exclusively focused on teenagers, most of
whom are only temporarily holding low-paying jobs.").

148

THE PROBLEM OF WAGE THEFT

little to no effect in incremental minimum wage increases. Dueling metaregression analyses in recent years have come to opposite conclusions, 26 7
and economists are now roughly split between those who believe small
minimum wage increases will cause a loss of low-wage jobs and those who
do not.2 68 Economists also disagree about whether minimum wage
increases cause a decrease in the number of hours worked by low-wage
workers. Some studies show that hours worked by low-wage workers
decrease after a minimum wage increase.26 9 Other studies show a
negligible or positive effect on hours.27 0
Prior to the Fight for Fifteen movement, most minimum wage
increases were relatively small, and therefore, most research could not
explore the effect a large increase would have on low-wage workers. The
various successful efforts to raise the minimum wage across the country
have provided fertile ground for researchers to reexamine these questions
in a natural laboratory. The results from the first of these experiments in
Seattle, which was the first city to raise the minimum wage to $15.00, have
been decidedly mixed.271 One study out of the University of Washington
found that when Seattle raised its minimum wage to $13.00 (an
incremental step on the way to a $15 minimum wage), the average low-

267. CompareHristos Doucouliagos &T.D. Stanley, PublicationSelection Bias in
Minimum-Wage Research?A Meta-RegressionAnalysis, 47 BRIT. J. OF INDUS.
REL. 406, 422 (2009) (showing no negative association between minimum
wages and employment) with DAVID NEUMARK & WILLIAM L. WASCHER, MINIMUM
WAGEs (2008) (finding minimum wage to be a poor policy tool based on

analysis of a variety of factors).
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268. A 2013 survey of 38 economists found that 34% agreed that an increase of
the minimum wage to $9.00 per hour would decrease low-wage
employment, 32% disagree, and 24% were uncertain. See IGMForum,
Minimum Wage (February 26, 2013), http://www.igmchicago.org/
WHAT DOES THE MINIMUM WAGE Do? 108 (2014).

269. See Neumark & Wascher, supra note 263, at 1312; Neumark & Wascher,
supranote 48, at 332.
270. See Arindrajit Dube et al., The Economic Effects of a Citywide Minimum
Wage, 60 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 552, 531 (2007) (finding a negligible effect on

hours); Madeline Zavodny, The Effect ofthe Minimum Wage on Employment
andHours, 7 LAB. EcoN. 729, 729 (2000) (finding a positive effect on hours).
271. See Jordan Weissman, The $15 Question, SLATE (July 6, 2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2017/07/seattle-s-hug
e-wage-hike-might-be-backfiring-it won_t_stop-the-fightjfor.html
[https://perma.cc/BQF4-CJWL].
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wage worker worked nine percent fewer hours per month.27 2 Despite the
increase in their hourly wage, the average low-wage worker took home
$125 less per month.27 3
The study was criticized for methodological issues that may have
overestimated the adverse effects of the minimum wage increase,
including the fact that it excluded multi-location businesses and failed to
account for Seattle's red hot employment market.2 74 A competing study
275
and even
from the Berkeley Labor Center found minimal to no effects,
the Seattle study showed little effect of an initial increase to $11.00 per
hour. 27 6 In other words, the verdict is still out on how successful the
Seattle experiment has been and whether a $15.00 minimum wage is
prudent, even in one the United States' healthiest labor markets. The
debate will undoubtedly continue as more data from the recent minimum
wage experiments begins to come in. Nevertheless, almost all economists
agree that above a certain point, minimum wage increases will lead to
reductions in low-wage jobs and other adverse effects on low-wage
workers.2 7 7
272. See Ekaterina Jardim et al., Minimum Wage Increases, Wages, andLow- Wage
Employment: Evidence from Seattle 2 (Nat'I Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 23532, 2017).
273. Id.

274. See Ben Zipperer &John Schmitt, The "HighRoad" Seattle LaborMarketand
the Effects of the Minimum Wage Increase: Data Limitations and
Methodological Problems Bias New Analysis of Seattle's Minimum Wage
Increase, EcoN. POL'Y INST. (2017), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-highroad-seattle-labor-market-and-the-effects-of-the-minimum-wage-increasedata-limitations-and-methodological-problems-bias-new-analysis-ofseattles-minimum-wage-incr [https://perma.cc/A69R-72ZX].
275. See Michael Reich et al., Seattle's Minimum Wage Experience 2015-16, INST.
FOR RES. ON LAB. & EMP. (2017), http://irle.berkeley.edu/files/2017/SeattlesMinimum-Wage-Experiences-2015-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/AC8V-QAXG].
276. See Jardim et al., supranote 272, at 2.
277. See DAVID CARD & ALAN KRUEGER, MYTH AND MEASUREMENT 13 (1995) ("Of

course, if the minimum wage is increased too much, firms will choose to cut
employment, just as in the conventional model."); Steven Greenhouse, $15
Wage in Fast Food Stirs Debate on Effects, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/05/business/15-wage-in-fast-food-

stirs-debate-on-effects.html [https://perma.cc/Q7HA-ZGUU]; Paul Krugman,
Raise That Wage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
[https://perma.cc/5K
2013/02/18/opinion/krugman-raise-that-wage.html

AW-968B] ("[E]ven most liberal economists would, I suspect, agree that
setting a minimum wage of, say, $20 an hour would create a lot of
problems.").
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In a situation in which the minimum wage is set too high, employers
may choose to commit wage theft rather than cut low-wage jobs or hours.
In fact, some economists have argued that the reason that larger effects are
absent after minimum wage increases is because some employers simply
decide not to comply with the higher minimum wage. 2 7 8 But even in this
case, wage theft is not the optimal solution. Wage theft's ills are unevenly
distributed, with women, minorities, and immigrant workers suffering a
disproportionate amount of the harm.279 Moreover, there are secondary
effects of wage theft that cause further harms, including the economic
insecurity that results from not knowing when wage theft will occur and
the illegal retaliation that often occurs when workers complain.
If minimum wage compliance were to increase, then some of the
negative effects of minimum wage policy may become apparent. Without
an "escape valve," employers may decide to cut jobs or hours in a way that
harms low-wage workers. If this occurred, then policy-makers would need
to reevaluate whether the minimum wage was set too high, or find some
other way of supplementing low-wage workers' income that did not rely
on employer compliance with wage and hour laws. 2 8 0 Because we have
never had full or near-full compliance with wage and hour laws, we do not
know precisely how the market and employers would respond. Right now,
however, we have a minimum wage in theory, but not in practice. If we are
committed to ensuring that the minimum wage protects workers from
exploitation, then we have to address wage theft.

278. See RONALD

EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITHER, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY
AND PUBLIC POLICY 111 (11th ed. 2012); Arnab K. Basu et al., Turninga Blind

Eye: Costly Enforcement Credible Commitment and Minimum Laws, 120
ECON. J. 244, 246 (2010).

279. Noah Zatz has sought to justify the minimum wage as a civil rights protection
that prohibits employers from discriminating against certain workers by
paying them a wage below other workers. See Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum
Wage as a Civil Rights Protection:An Alternative to Anticoverty Arguments,
1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 1-3 (2009).
280. One example of such a program is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),
which supplemented the income of low-wage workers with a refundable tax
credit that is calculated as a percentage of total income. See, e.g., Daniel
Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the EarnedIncome CreditandOptimalSubsidy
Policy 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405, 408 (1997).
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CONCLUSION

The wage theft crisis requires that we completely rethink minimum
wage enforcement. Current wage theft campaigns do not; instead they
advocate for changes around the margins and hope that will be enough.
But they are not enough, and predictably so. This article explores some
possible solutions, including a greater emphasis on enforcement and a
focus on changing social norms. It also explores particular enforcement
strategies that may increase compliance with wage and hours laws, such as
wage insurance and recovery-first enforcement. None of these strategies
alone are likely to solve the problem. The extent of the wage theft crisis
requires us to think outside the box and pursue multiple strategies;
otherwise, the problem of wage theft will persist.
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